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Human Rights and Wrongs: The United States
and the I.L.O.-A Modern Morality Play
by Bruce L. Rockwood
" . and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly,..."
(Micah 6:8)1
O N NOVEMBER 1, 1977, President Jimmy Carter issued a state-
ment terminating United States membership in the International
Labour Organization (ILO). 2 This action culminated a series of steps
undertaken by the United States since 1970 which have demonstrated
American displeasure with the organization, 3 a displeasure cogently
detailed in the letter of intent to withdraw sent by then Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger to Francis Blanchard, Director General of the
ILO, on November 5, 1975:
This letter constitutes notice of the intention of the United States to
withdraw from the International Labour Organization. It is transmit-
ted pursuant to article 1, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the
organization. . . . Rather than express regret at this action, I would
prefer to express confidence in what will be its ultimate outcome.
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law; J.D.,
Chicago (1974); B.A., Swarthmore (1968); member of the Illinois Bar; Chairman of
the ABA Subcommittee on Trade and Monetary Reform, 1976-77. The author would
like to express his thanks to Teshume Teklu, J.D., Ohio Northern Univ. (1976), and
Denise Arn, J.D. Candidate, Ohio Northern Univ. (1978), for their assistance in
gathering the information contained herein. Appreciation is also extended to the ILO
Liaison Office at the United Nations as well as the United States Mission to the United
Nations, both of whom provided reference materials during the final stages of research
for this article.
Micah 6:8 (King James), quoted in President Carter's Inaugural Address, Jan.
20, 1977, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 87 (Jan. 22, 1977). See also the sentiments
expressed in The President's Remarks to People of Other Nations on Assuming Office,
13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 89 (Jan. 22, 1977).
2 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1705-06 (Nov. 7, 1977).
3 Schwebel, The United States Assaults the LL.O., 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 136
(1971); Interview with Harvey Batton, ILO Librarian, United Nations Bldg. (Dec. -22,
1977). United States displeasure concerns the business and labor components of the
U.S. delegation. The ILO is little known in the United States, with no strong lobbying
behind it for the ironic reason that American labor standards are already more ad-
vanced than those which the ILO seeks to promote for the world as a whole. Thus, the
ILO can do little for American labor, while its more extremist members and their
political activities can easily antagonize the American private sector.
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The United States does not desire to leave the ILO.... But we do
intend to make every possible effort to promote the conditions which
will facilitate our continued participation. If this should prove im-
possible, we are in fact prepared to depart.
I should like to present four matters of fundamental concern:
1. The erosion of Tripartite Representation.
2. Selective concern for Human Rights.
3. Disregard of Due Process.
4. The Increasing Politicization of the Organization. 4
In the intervening two years the ILO attempted to adapt itself in
several areas to meet American criticism. Reform efforts received con-
siderable support from Western European delegations.' Despite
arguments that the Americans merely misperceived the role of the ILO
in the current international legal order,6 the climate of hostility to the
ILO remains strong in some key American business and labor circles.
When President Carter took office, he inherited this condition
along with the entire burden of government, and it is therefore not
surprising that Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall should admit in
retrospect:
Of course when the Carter administration came in, we examined that
letter and the efforts that were being made to try to change those
conditions and what we concluded was that the conditions outlined in
the letter were reasonable and that we ought to try to get those
changes. And therefore, we affirmed the Kissinger letter.7
Thus, in February 1977, the State Department again warned that the
ultimate decision whether to withdraw would depend upon changes
within the ILO to satisfy the United States government, and American
business and labor.8
4 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1582 (1975), excerpted at BN 2-4 (ILO Doc.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Kissinger]. For a preliminary evaluation of this letter, see
Note, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 623 (1976).
' Briefing by F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, in Washington, D.C., Nov.
1, 1977 [hereinafter cited as Marshall]; Letter from Leo Tindmans, President of the
Council of the European Communities, Brussels (Sept. 9, 1977), 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 1388-89 (Sept. 21, 1977), urging the United States to work within the ILO
for reform.
6 Margaret Stewart discusses the non-political issues of the ILO in BRITAIN AND
THE ILO: THE STORY OF 50 YEARS (1969).
' Marshall, supra note 5, at 3.
8 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 197 (1977). See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INT'L
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When the June 1977 International Labour Conference 9 failed to
adopt American proposals to "depoliticize" debate in that forum and
to restore due process to the enforcement of ILO human rights stand-
ards, 10 the issue became oversimplified in some circles as one of
credibility; that is, whether the United States should proceed with the
withdrawal in order to maintain its credibility in the ILO and in other
international bodies." Secretary Marshall, however, emphasized that
this action was not a precedent for United States policy towards other
United Nations agencies. Quite the contrary:
[Far] from weakening our commitment to other organizations, [with-
drawal] probably strengthens our commitment to those organizations
partly because people will assume that it would weaken it.
Therefore, we will direct our efforts to trying to reassure people that
we will not.
12
The promise to withdraw if changes were not made in the ILO ap-
pears to have been as much a promise to the AFL/CIO as it was to the
ILO. It was arguably made, and finally executed, to satisfy domestic
ORGANIZATIONS (Comm. Print 1977). "At the time actions in international organiza-
tions by a majority of member countries have made the organizations increasingly con-
troversial. For example, the International Labour Organization . . . and [UNESCO]
have been seriously hurt by political actions taken in these organizations." Id. at ix.
"We must be firm, however, in our opposition to the wrongful use of such organiza-
tions to promote political or ideological causes. Where U.S. efforts encounter only
abuse, we should withdraw from the organization." Id. at xi.
' The International Labour Conference is the Governing Body of the ILO, in
the tradition of international labor organizations that the conference should set policy
and serve as the governing agency. Interview with Professor Richard Meininger,
Department of Economics, Ohio Northern University, in Ada, Ohio (Jan. 31, 1978).
See Articles 2-6, & 19 of the ILO Constitution, and compare the issue of whether the
Conference can, or should, be able to override the Governing Body on matters such as
its agenda, despite U.S. concerns with due process; articles 14 & 16(3); and the con-
ference debate on the issue of structure. Instrument for the Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the International Labour Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 3485,
T.I.A.S. No. 5401, 466 U.N.T.S. 323 [subsequent citations will be to the 1946 ILO
Constitution, as amended].
10 Marshall, supra note 5, at 4. Letter from Tadd Linsenmayer, Program and
Policy Coordinator for ILO Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, to Professor B.
Rockwood, Ohio Northern University (Dec. 19, 1977). The 1977 Delegation Report is
not yet available. See also Kissinger, supra note 4, at 1583-84.
" The ILO-and Goodbye, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Nov. 13, 1977, at 14,
col. 4 (editorial).
"2 Marshall, supra note 5, at 2-3.
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political observers rather than international considerations.' 3 It is
worth noting that the initial policy was begun by an administration
whose attitude towards international bodies and human rights had
been roundly attacked by President Carter during the recent Presiden-
tial election campaign. The argument within President Carter's own
cabinet in favor of extending the deadline for withdrawal was rejected,
not primarily for legal reasons, 14 but as a political sop to George
Meany.' 5
As a result, the decision to withdraw was made and went into ef-
fect on November 6, 1977, cutting the ILO's annual budget by 25% 16
which necessitated significant cutbacks in the ILO's staff and pro-
grams.' 7 [See Appendix I]
11 See, e.g., Moynihan, End of a Dream, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Nov.
20, 1977, at 15, col. 4; Schwebel, supra note 3; Out of the ILO, Manchester Guardian
Weekly, Nov. 13, 1977, at 15, col. 4.
1 Compare Article 1 of the ILO Constitution, which is silent on extensions, but
permits nations such as the U.S. to rejoin merely by communicating their intent to re-
join, with the vague comments of Secretary Marshall, supra note 5, at 5.
1 The problem is not reconciliation but the votes of the other ILO members. For
there is little difference if we abandon the entity because of losing votes. See News
Conference by Mr. Cooper, June 3, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 648 (1977).
16 Cf U.N. Press Release, Office of Public Information, ILO/1989 (Nov. 2,
1977).
11 Statement of the Director-General, ILO Circular No. 202 (Nov. 8, 1977):
"The withdrawal of the major contributor to the budget of the Organization will, as
you know, deprive us of 25 per cent of our revenue for the coming biennium, 1978-79;
in other words, a total of $42,300,000." The Director-General emphasizes the loss of
the U.S. and its contribution will "weaken" ILO actions, but should not be an "ir-
reversible blow." He called for an initial budget cut of 19.2%, or $32,500,000, arguing
that "other measures" could fill the gap between that amount and the 25% loss of
funds due to U.S. withdrawal. Director-General Blanchard noted it would be "in-
conceivable" to cut out entirely any of the major ILO programs." Instead, staff cuts,
postponed meetings, elimination of new recruitment, and reduction in bureaucratic
apparatus seem to be his main emphasis. One area of contention is his statement that
his cuts would retain the decentralized structure of the ILO's secretariat adopted in re-
cent years. Decentralization puts more staff into the field in developing countries, thus
spreading money and manpower around, but opens the ILO to charges of wasteful-
ness, inefficiency, or being open to local influence. Part of the slack has already been
made up by contributions, in amounts as yet unannounced, by the Philippines and
Venezuela, above their assessed dues. ILO Press Release, First Voluntary Contribution
to ILO (Nov. 8, 1977); ILO Press Release, Philippines Pres. Marcos Pledges Addi-
tional Contribution to ILO Budget (Nov. 30, 1977).
It is clear the ILO cannot rely on such voluntary extra payments permanently to
makeup the deficit. See Measures to Deal with the Financial Situation Resulting from
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze this action and its conse-
quences for the international legal protection of human rights. What
happened from 1975 to 1977 to cause the United States to take steps
towards a United Nations agency which previously it never had taken
with any comparable body, despite considerable provocation? What is
the role of the ILO in the U.N. family of agencies, and how will
American withdrawal affect that role? Can American departure from
the ILO be reconciled with the Carter Administration's clearly enun-
ciated, fundamental commitment to enhance global human rights, and
the apparent desire of President Carter to take a forward, aggressive
position in promoting broader understanding of the meaning of
human rights?"8 Finally, what is the prospect for reconciliation with
the ILO in the near future, and what steps should be taken now to
promote such a reconciliation?' 9
the Withdrawal of the United States, 12th Agenda item, Governing Body of the ILO,
204th Sess., 1977. External borrowing to make up the deficit was opposed at the ses-
sion of the Governing Body, and a spokesman for the Group of 77 suggested that if
full, 25% cuts were necessary, the balance should be struck fairly between "human
rights programs" and "programs designed to promote social welfare." The Yugoslav
Delegate, as a Group of 77 spokesman, felt the Director-General's initial 19.2% pro-
posed reduction did not do this. "For example, programme 50 (International Labour
Standards and Human Rights) would still reflect a net increase of 4.3% in the next
biennium, despite the reductions proposed now, while programme 40 (Employment
and Development) was to suffer a net decrease of 6.2%." Third Report of the Pro-
gramme, Financial and Administrative Committee, 14th Agenda item, Governing
Body of the ILO, 204th Sess., 1977. Mr. Plant, the United Kingdom worker delegate,
supported a gradual transition to a full 25% cut. The employers' delegate suggested
further consolidation and stated: "Many employer members knew from experience that
slow-moving solutions to problems which called for staff cuts were far worse from the
point of view of staff morale than immediate sharp reductions .. " Further cuts may
come at the February 1978 meeting of the Governing Body. See Appendix I.
" The Group of 77 was founded at the 1965 United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development when UNCTAD was created. Moynihan, Abiotrophy in Tur-
tle Bay: The UN in 1975, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 465, 467 (1976). Membership
numbered 112 in 1976. Those nations with whom we must deal either with reason or
force, clearly outnumber us in many international bodies other than those with limited
membership or weighted voting (e.g., bilateral bodies and the IMF). See Moynihan,
supra note 13.
19 The theory is that the ILO needs the U.S. more than the U.S. needs the ILO,
but whether this is more than wishful thinking remains to be seen. Reconciliation with
the ILO would seem not to be the real problem, since our problem is the conduct of
other members. But it matters little if we abandon the entity because of losing votes.
See Cooper, Department Discusses Results of CIEC Meeting, 77 DEP'T STATE BULL. 92
(1977).
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The International Labour Organization was established in 1919 as
a part of the Paris Peace Conference which ended World War 1.20
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labour,
was also President of the Commission on International Labour Legisla-
tion which drafted that part of the Versailles Treaty which became the
first Constitution of the ILO. 21
The authors of that Constitution sought to improve the conditions
of labour everywhere. They did so not only for the sake of the human
rights and welfare of workers, but also as an instrument for promoting
the overriding goal of permanent peace. 22 Thus, the preamble to the
first Constitution of the ILO states:
Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of
universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based
upon social justice; .... 23
The founders saw the human rights of workers as a necessary concern
of the international system. The avoidance of further devastating wars
was the touchstone which lent legitimacy to the enterprise.
After the second World War had begun, it was deemed necessary
to revise the ILO Constitution and to reaffirm the commitment of its
members to the furtherance of the rights of labour. The link between
human rights and peace was reaffirmed in 1946 when the general con-
ference of the ILO adopted the revised text of the Constitution:
Whereas universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is
based upon social justice; And whereas conditions of labour exist in-
volving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of
people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of
the world are imperiled; .... 24
Previously, in 1944 at a meeting in Philadelphia, the 26th Session
of the International Labour Conference had adopted a Declarations of
Aims and Purposes of the ILO, known as the Declaration of Philadel-
phia. This document further served the organization as a declaration
20 See G. WEAVER, THE ILO AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ILO 1965); A. ALCOCK,
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 1-36 (1971); G. JOHNSTON,
THE ILO: ITS WORK FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS (1978).
21 BN 2-6 (ILO Doc. 1977); A. ALCOCK, supra note 20; Kissinger, supra note 4,
at 1582.
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of rights, of intent, and of commitment by its members to take steps to
achieve its goals in the aftermath of the second great war of the cen-
tury. 25 The United States, which had joined the ILO in 1934,26 sup-
ported this Declaration at that time, and again when it ratified the
new Constitution in 1948.27
The Declaration made it clear that the promotion of the human
rights of workers, in comprehensive social, economic, and political
terms, was the legitimate goal of the ILO. States supporting the
Declaration undertook to support the principle that the ILO could
pursue its aims in consultation and coordination with other interna-
tional organizations. Its primary purpose was to elaborate specific
labor standards in the form of conventions or recommendations.2" In
1945 the ILO became the first of the specialized agencies of the United
Nations. 29
The Declaration also stated, in broad language, that the ILO
could consider other subjects which "bear upon" the concerns of labor.
Such provisions would entail some overlap with other international in-
stitutions, and would risk offending the political sensibilities of some of
its membership.3 0
Is Id. at Annex to 1946 Constitution (The Declaration of Philadelphia) [herein-
after cited as Phil. Dec.].
26 See Hudson, The Membership of the United States in the ILO, 28 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 669 (1934).
21 S.J. Res. 117, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). That the U.S. fully supported these
principles at the time is clear from the language of the resolution:
[U.S. membership in the ILO] has proved of benefit to the people of the
United States; and Whereas the ILO provides a unique international forum
in which representatives of employers and workers join together with those of
governments in formulating conventions and recommendations which serve as
international minimum standards for labor and social legislation and ad-
ministration within member countries; . . . and Whereas the constitution...
of 1945 was adopted unanimously on October 9, 1946, with the entire delega-
tion of the United States [in support] ....
28 Phil. Dec., supra note 25, part II(e) & III.
21 The ILO-The Fact Sheet for Americans, ILO, Wash., D.C. Office (1946).
10 Alcock notes that the Constitution, as originally drafted, failed to explicitly
give the ILO any economic powers, despite language which would make "intricate
economic" matters clearly of concern to it. As a consequence, such efforts as the
World Employment Program are largely a matter of exhortation to the members, and
other U.N. agencies, to do more for various goals set by the ILO. Cf. W. LANDSKRON.
ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS- 1976, at 232-33 (ILO 1977). More could
be done by explicitly lending labor and manpower expertise, and injecting employment
considerations, in the inspection teams of the major lending agencies, such as the IMF
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Thereafter, the ILO continued the work begun in the 1920's for
the elaboration of an international labor code, creating universal
standards in such areas as wages and hours, occupational health and
safety, migrant labor, unemployment, health and social security
benefits, freedom 'of association, and the abolition of forced labor.3'
The ILO concerned itself with vocational training of workers and with
the training of manpower experts from various countries who would in
turn establish vocational programs in their own countries.3 2 It publish-
ed voluminous literature on labor issues."3 It provided a forum in
which workers, employers, and government officials could meet to
and the World Bank. Telephone interview with Leo A. Suslow, Director of Int'l Af-
fairs Dep't, UAW (Jan. 16, 1978). Thus, while the ILO's enforcement and action pro-
gram powers are limited, its mandate for discussion and the recommendation of
member state conduct is broader than the "narrow sphere of labor legislation," as
Alcock calls it. Compare ILO documents with the 1974 U.N. Charter of Economic
Rights & Duties of State, and the U.S. reaction.
"' As of January 1, 1977, the United States had still only ratified 7 of the 147
Conventions which had been adopted by the General Conference by June 1976. Chart
of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, ILO (1977). The rate of ratifica-
tions in 1977 by ILO member states was one of the highest recorded. Of the 148
ratifications of the various conventions, 30 were reconfirmations of new members for
conventions previously adopted on their behalf by colonial powers, and 118 were new
ratifications. (ILO Document, unpublished, 1978). This is the greatest number of new
ratifications since the ILO's 50th anniversary in 1969. While it does not demonstrate
that these nations are more advanced than the United States in actual labor practice,
it does demonstrate the important role of the ILO in setting standards and goals,
which permit workers in all countries to aspire to the level of working conditions, social
security and human rights which workers in the western industrial states have ac-
quired. The Conventions relating to human rights-trade unions, elimination of
discrimination, and abolition of forced labor-received 32 ratifications in 1977, slightly
more than 20% of the total. Despite this, the United States claims that such rights are
not being furthered by the ILO. The role of the ILO in publicizing failures to adhere
to ratified conventions is well known. T. Teklu, The Origins and Function of the ILO,
(unpublished manuscript, Ohio Northern Univ., 1975). For an independent, critical
evaluation of the effectiveness of the ILO Conventions and ILO supervision, see E.
LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF THE
I.L.O. EXPERIENCE (1966).
31 World Employment Report, Int'l Labour Office, Background Paper No. 1
(1975). See Res. No. 19, Commendation of the ILO's Promotion of Human Rights,
Washington Conference on Law and the World, Oct. 17, 1975 [hereinafter cited as
Wash. Conference]; D. MORSE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ILO AND ITS
ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1969).
" For a complete listing of the ILO publications, see ILO Catalogue of Publica-
tions in Print (1977). The ILO's International Labour Review is its law journal. This
may be reduced to a quarterly publication due to budget cuts.
[Vol. 10:359
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discuss topics of mutual interest and to become acquainted on an in-
formal basis.3 4 It concerned itself with unemployment, assistance to
unions in new nations, and problems of development generally.3" The
accomplishments of the ILO were widely recognized, and in 1969 it
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its humanitarian work. 6 In
1975 it was honored again by the Seventh World Conference on Law
for its promotion of "a large body of international law relating to
human rights," and for its mechanisms for the "effective implementa-
tion of these international labour standards. '"3 7
The ILO's machinery for supervising the ratification of its Conven-
tions, and the implementation of its guidelines was one of the first to
provide for the right of individuals to complain to an international
agency.3 8 Although limited in enforcement powers, the ILO's human
rights machinery is the most elaborate in existence for an international
body which strives to be universal in membership. It has been widely
praised for this contribution to international law.3 9
Yet, despite its success, the ILO has been a continual source of
controversy in the United States since the end of the Second World
War. This is largely due to the readmission of the Soviet Union in
1954. A controversy arose over whether a Communist state, or any
similar authoritarian state, could comply with the tripartite structure
of the institution. 40 In particular, the United States representatives
were vehemently opposed to the readmission of the Soviet Union, and
34 Article 3 of the Constitution provides for delegates, alternates, and advisors to
attend the Convention for each tripartite delegation. The United States delegation in
1976 numbered 40 persons. ILO Constitution, art. 3; U.S. Delegation Report, 61st
Sess., Int'l Labour Conference, 1976, at appendix I.
I The Declaration of Philadelphia compels this broad concern with workers'
social, economic, civil, and human rights. The problem of resolving conflict between
labor's rights to act as an autonomous force, and the goals of development in new
states with limited democracy, is directly addressed by the ILO in its attempts to im-
plement the liberal goals of its Constitution. G. CAIRE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
EcOMONic DEVELOPMENT (Int'l Labour Office 1977).
3 The I.L.O. on Trial, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1976, at 36, col. 1.
s' Wash. Conference, supra note 32. See F. Wolf, Work Paper on the ILO Ex-
perience in the Implementation of Human Rights, presented to the Seventh Con-
ference of the Law of the World, Wash., D.C., Oct. 12-17, 1975.
18 ILO Constitution, art. 19; Note, supra note 4; F. Wolf, supra note 37. Reply
of the Director-General, Human Rights and the ILO, 52nd Sess., Int'l Labour Con-
ference (1968).
39 Wash. Conference, supra note 32.
40 Note, supra note 4, at 625-26; Schwebel, supra note 3, at 141.
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they pointed out the inconsistency of the Soviet Union's domestic
regime with the conventions against forced labor and the ILO policy of
favoring freedom of association.4
1
This concern flared up again in 1970 when the new Director
General of the ILO, C. Wilfred Jenks, informed the American Deputy
Undersecretary of State for International Affairs, George H. Hilde-
brand, that along with the appointment of a United States national to
the senior directorate of the ILO, he also was going to appoint a Soviet
national as Assistant Director General of the ILO. 42 The United States
had supported Jenks in his election.
This information apparently caused an uproar in the United States
delegation, leading to remarks by George Meany, head of the United
States AFL/CIO, that this was "the last straw .... It is quite obvious
that the [International Labour] office is, and has been for some time,
in the Russians' corner." 4 The AFL/CIO selects the American labor
delegate to the general conference.
The result of Meany's complaint, and of subsequent actions by
Congressman John J. Rooney of New York City, was the illegal with-
holding of the American contribution to the ILO budget for the re-
maining half of 1970.44 It was argued that the Soviets received dif-
ferent treatment than the United States in the ILO, raising complaints
of a "double standard" in the institution which would appear comical
in their naivete were they not familiar now in the light of the United
States' withdrawal in 1977. 4 1
41 Schwebel, supra note 3, at 141. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Chile
have all been closely scrutinized with respect to freedom of association and forced
labor practices. U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 34, at 7-8. This did not change
the adverse publicity attached to the political debate.
42 Schwebel, supra note 3, at 136-37.
41 Id. at 137.
44 Id. at 137-39. Illegality of withholding dues was emphatically noted by the
State Department in a letter to Congress. E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 221-31 (1976).
41 Schwebel, supra note 3, at 141-42. It would seem to make more sense for the
U.S. to publicly highlight the work of the ILO committees which expose Soviet viola-
tions and open Third World states to ridicule. Ambassador Moynihan's actions in the
General Assembly could be copied in the ILO. ILO records demonstrate the paucity of
U.S. ratifications, thus preventing the U.S. from charging the Soviet Union with
failure to abide by the ILO Conventions. If detente compels us to refrain from attack-
ing other violators of the ILO Conventions, why should the U.S. attack the ILO for
selective actions? Selectivity and discrimination are not per se illegal or immoral con-
cepts. The only real issue is their permissible basis and practical impact.
[Vol. 10:359
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Eventually the United States paid its arrears and retained its vote
in the ILO, 46 yet the causes of controversy did not subside. The com-
mitment of the ILO to two goals-tripartite representation and univer-
sality in membership-continued to plague relations between the
United States and the ILO throughout the 1970's. Tripartite represen-
tation meant that member states in the ILO were not represented solely
by government bureaucrats, but rather by delegations of four persons,
two representing the government of the day, and one each represen-
ting the interests of business and labor. The theory was that such
delegations would be best suited for arriving at acceptable and en-
forceable labor standards. 47
Universalism meant that the ILO sought the widest possible
membership, not to be limited by requiring either prior membership in
the League of Nations (later, in the United Nations), or strict com-
pliance by member states with the full implications of its Constitution.
From time to time states had withdrawn from the ILO and later re-
joined.4 8 However, never in practice has a state been excluded because
it violated the rights of labor. 49 The withdrawal of South Africa in
1966 was due to pressures regarding human rights. In other situations
the philosophy of membership seems to have assumed that the ILO
could do more for workers if their states, however oppressive, were
members. 5 0
Together, tripartism and universalism have caused controversy.
The member states are not represented solely by professional diplomats
or government officials in ILO conferences and committees, but by -
representatives of the private sector as well. Universalism has meant
46 The U.S. lagged behind in its payments to the ILO for several years, but
ultimately paid all back dues to fulfill a precondition for withdrawal as required by
Article 1(4) of the ILO Constitution.
47 G. WEAVER, supra note 20.
48 BN-3 (ILO Doc. 1977).
49 G. JOHNSTON, supra note 20; BN-9 (ILO Doc. 1977).
10 Consider the decision to seat the workers' delegate from fascist Italy in the
1920's, despite his apparent lack of independence. A. ALCOCK, supra note 20, at
67-80; G. JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 25-46, Note, supra note 4, at 625-27. From
Italy to the Soviet Union, the ILO has accepted delegations whose credentials could be
subject to challenge. The case of the PLO is different. Its agents were admitted as
observers only at the indication of similar acceptance by the U.N. As a U.N. affiliate,
the ILO should follow the spirit of the U.N. but the ILO did not take any action
toward the expulsion of Israel. See ECONOMIST, infra note 51. The entire sequence of
events may be subject to criticism, but there is no reason for the ILO to be singled out
for attack under any rules of international law.
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that many of the ILO's member states come from societies which for
all practical purposes lack an independent private sector.
This is the context in which the events of 1975 to 1977 must be
viewed. The ILO had existed for some time with United States
membership and support. Much like many other international bodies,
its membership and voting record reflected the changing membership
of the community of nations following the decolonization of the 1950's
and 1960's. In the 1970's, the situation was complicated by a new
twist, the arrival on the international scene of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). The PLO has sought to harass Israel and her
western allies and to obtain recognition for itself.
The PLO previously had obtained observer status at the United
Nations. In November 1974, PLO leader Yassir Arafat appeared, armed,
before the General Assembly and denounced the West. 51 Other U.N.
agencies granted the PLO observer status, and soon the issue of
Palestine and the PLO became one of the standard sources of conflict
in international organizations. A vote on a Palestinian-related issue in
any international body generally would guarantee anti-Israeli, pro-
PLO results. Communist forces invariably voted in tandem with the
Arabs. Many developing states went along with the anti-Israeli position
for several reasons: residual anti-Western colonialism, desire for Arab
monetary support in the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo, and
fear.52
On June 9, 1975, the General Conference of the ILO, meeting in
Geneva, voted to amend its rules to give the PLO the observer status it
sought with the ILO.5 3 The vote was 246 to 35, in favor of the PLO,
with 66 abstentions.5 4 When the observer delegation from the PLO was
actually seated on June 12, 1975, the American trade union delega-
51 See ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1974, at 16-17; and Nov. 23, 1974, at 42-43.
" See Zionism as Racism, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1975, at 54; Nov. 15, 1975, at
20: Nov. 22, 1975, at 65; Nov. 29, 1975, at 8. The PLO remains a factor in the Mid-
dle East, despite the recent initiative of Sadat. It is not clear whether the PLO issue
will fade from the agenda of the ILO in time for the United States to rejoin on that
basis. See Press Release GA/5686 (Nov. 25, 1977), and GA/5688 (Nov. 28, 1977),
which address the Palestine issue. See also Vicker, A Palestine State is the Minimum
Condition for Peace, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1978, at 10, col. 6; President Carter's State-
ment at Aswan, Dep't of State Press Release, Jan. 4, 1978; and F. Kessler, Mideast
Chasm: Egypt/Israel Deadlock Shows the Deep Split Over Palestine Issue, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
1s Informal Report, Comm. on the Int'l Labour Conference, 60th Sess. (1975);
N.Y. Times, June 10, 1975, at 6, col. 5.
" Report, supra note 53.
[Vol. 10:359
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS
tion, led by Irving Brown of the AFL/CIO, walked out of the con-
ference in protest. Brown stated at the time that his group had "never
opposed legitimate movements fighting for their freedom and in-
dependence," but that the AFL/CIO was opposed to the admission of
a "liberation movement that did not represent an 'oppressed state' and
whose goal was the 'destruction of another state.' "55 The United States
government and business delegates initially joined the labor group in
protest, but later rejoined the proceedings of the conference.5 s The
New York Times editorialized: "The American delegation walked out,
calling the vote a tragic decision because the PLO was a political, not
a labor entity under the ILO charter."5 " Thus, the recurrent cry was
heard again; the ILO is "too politicized" in its behavior.
The United States walkout from the conference was denounced as
"uninformed and irresponsible" by James Zogby, Vice President of
Americans for Justice and Understanding in the Middle East. Mr.
Zogby argued that despite the AFL/CIO's protestations, the PLO
observer to the ILO did in fact represent the work force of the Palesti-
nian people, and pointed out that "if every nation and organization
followed such a course in international affairs, no international forums
would exist.""8 In urging his own viewpoint that United States opposi-
tion to the PLO was delaying peace in the Middle East, Mr. Zogby
clearly was making a political argument. But it was in response to a
political act by the United States delegation concerning the long range
institutional goals of the ILO which were bound to conflict with the
short-run political concerns of the United States and her allies.5 9 The
Constitution of the ILO, and previous ILO practice, mandated con-
cern for workers everywhere, with a view to enhancing peace. Just as
the AFL/CIO views its duty in international fora to support Israel as a
necessary condition of peace, it is not unreasonable to expect the ILO
to wish to deal with the legitimate, labor-related issues of the Palesti-
nian people in the interests of peace. Whether the AFL/CIO vision of
the future, or that of the PLO, is likely to be implemented, is open to
question. Whatever the eventual outcome, it seems strange for
15 N.Y. Times, June 13, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
56 Id.
51 Gnawing at the U.N., N.Y Times, June 21, at 1975, at 26, col. 2.
58 Zogby, World Labor: AFLICIO v. PLO, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1975, at 38,
col. 3.
59 ECONOMIST, supra note 52.
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American labor to attack the ILO when it is used as a stage for the
manifestation of political emotions which may overflow its normal
competence, but which have little to do with its actual conduct as an
institution.
The AFL/CIO walkout in 1975 set off a chain of events which il-
lustrated once again the power of George Meany in international mat-
ters of importance for American labor. 60 Strongly anti-socialist and
anti-communist, Meany perceived the ILO as having gone too far. He
arranged for an intense lobbying campaign in Congress to induce a cut
in the $5.6 million payment due the ILO from the United States for
the remainder of 1975, and to eliminate the entire 1976 payment. 61
After further consultations with President Ford, Meany authorized
his lobbyists to "unfreeze" the United States contribution to the ILO
later in 1975, so that the Kissinger letter could be sent in compliance
with Article I of the ILO Constitution. The United States would
withdraw, and under the Constitution it could withdraw only if its ar-
rears were paid in full. 62 At this time President Ford was seeking
reelection, and hoped to win the support of American labor by agree-
ing with Meany on this issue.
Apart from the seating of the PLO observer at the conference,
Meany and others in the United States were incensed with what they
viewed as a concerted attempt by the Third World Nations (Group of
77) and the Communist Bloc Nations in the ILO to condemn Israel
and selected right-wing governments for various human rights viola-
tions, while simultaneously blocking efforts to have violations of ILO
conventions in their own societies examined and commented upon. 6
The techniques used in achieving these ends gave rise to the com-
plaints of Secretary of State Kissinger concerning "selective concern for
human rights" and "disregard of due process" in ILO activities as voiced
in his November letter.
One example of this American view of a double standard for
human rights was the 1974 annual conference's condemnation of Israel
for racial discrimination against Arab workers living in the occupied
territories. The decision was announced in spite of the failure of the
appropriate committees of the ILO General Conference to find that
Israel had violated any of the ILO's human rights conventions.6 4 Other
60 Trade Unions: Isolated, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1977, at 36, col. 3.
61 Id.; Secretary of State Meany, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1975, at 28, col. 2.
62 ILO Constitution, art. 1.
63 Note, supra note 4, at 623, 632; Kissinger, supra note 4.
64 Note, supra note 4, at 130-31.
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countries regularly attacked by the ILO have been Chile, South
Africa, and the Portuguese colonies in Africa prior to their libera-
tion. 65
Kissinger's letter of intent pointed out the erosion of 'tripartite
representation and recalled the battles over the seating of the Com-
munist employer delegates in previous years. Tripartism raises the
question of the true autonomy of worker and employer delegates from
many of the developing and socialist nations now belonging to the
ILO.66 And while not expecting to reverse history, Secretary Kissinger
seems to have suggested in his letter that the ILO nonetheless should
defer to our interpretation in the cause of "a return to . . . basic prin-
ciples and . . . a fuller achievement of its fundamental purposes."'67
The threat of withdrawal and the consequent denial of 25% of the an-
nual budget of the ILO-by the United States seem to be the relevant
sanction implicit in the letter. 68
In 1976, the United'States saw little of the progress it had demanded
as a condition to remaining in the ILO. Before the 61st Annual Con-
ference opened on June 2, 1976, the Governing Body had decided that
the limited time and resources of the meeting would be best used if the
member states stuck to the agenda, and refrained from introducing
additional resolutions. The Director-General specifically requested that
the delegates not bring forth any new resolutions for conference con-
sideration. Hoping to avoid renewed political disputes, the conference
restricted the items to be considered to:
1) Program and budget proposals and other financial questions;
2) Information and reports on the application of ILO conventions
and recommendations;
3) Establishment of tripartite machinery to promote the implementa-
tion of international labor standards;
4) Working environment;
5) Employment and conditions of work and life of nursing personnel;
6) Report of the Working Party on Structure. 9
On May 18, the deadline for submitting resolutions for considera-
tion by the conference, several East European worker delegates in-
61 U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 34, at 7-8; 31st ILO Report to the U.N. at
5-8 (1977).
66 U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 34, at 7, 9; G. JOHNSTON, supra note 20.
61 Kissinger, supra note 4.
68 The long-term significance of the budget cut may be reduced by the sup-
plementary U.S. contributions to the UNDP.
69 U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 34, at 3.
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troduced three resolutions. These resolutions were concerned with: 1)
human rights and trade union freedom in Chile; 2) professionals and
similar (salaried) workers; 3) the protection of human rights and trade
union freedom in general.70
According to the United States delegation's report, all three of
these resolutions included objectionable political aspects. In the resolu-
tion involving Chile, there was a violation of due process.7 After
strong American protest against submission of the resolutions, they
were referred to the Governing Body for information.7 2 The Com-
munist delegate proposal led AFL/CIO Secretary-Treasurer Lane Kirk-
land to comment, "I expect the Communists to break their word; . ..
I am not disappointed at what they did, because I expect the worst of
them. The basic question, on which we await the answer, is how the
countries that should be our friends perform at Geneva. "13
The first major dispute of the 1976 Conference was the seating of
the PLO delegation in the special World Employment Conference of
1976, which would take place after the annual, general conference.
One week prior to the opening of the general conference, an amend-
ment which would have permitted participation by the PLO was re-
jected by a margin of one vote in the Governing Body. Despite the
Secretariat's opinion that the decision was not appealable, the Arab
bloc sent the labor ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and
Morocco to talk with newly-elected conference chairman Michael
O'Leary of Ireland. The ministers demanded that the full conference
vote on the right of the PLO to participate in the Employment Con-
ference. The ultimate result, after a series of tense moments and addi-
tional calls for a vote on the matter, was the seating of the PLO. 74
There followed a challenge to the credentials of the worker delegate of
Chile. Three international worker organizations charged that the
Chilean labor delegate could not legitimately represent the interests of
the workers of Chile because the government had suppressed the labor
movement within the State. After United States claims that failure to
70 Id. at 5.
" Since Chile was already under investigation by the appropriate committees, the
U.S. felt that full conference consideration of the issue at this time was out of order.
Id. at 6.
72 Id. at 5-6.
11 N.Y. Times, May 28, at 3, col. 1.
14 U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 34, at 6; The ILO on Trial, N.Y. Times,
June 16, 1976, at 36, col. 1.
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seat the delegate would result in a denial of due process, the vote
favored Chile and the delegate was seated.75
There was bitter debate over what to do about multinational cor-
porations. The World Employment Conference closed on June 17,
seeking the adoption by the ILO of a program aimed at generating
millions of new jobs, primarily in the developing countries, by the year
2000. The issue of the multinational corporations was not dealt with in
the draft of the plan, largely because of the inability to reconcile
several diametrically opposed approaches to the question. Many
developing countries blamed the multinationals for worldwide economic
imbalance, and sought limitations on their operations. The developed
states argued that multinationals are an important source of expanded
employment, especially in those countries which need increased
employment the most. The final proposals adopted by the Conference
were deemed satisfactory by the American delegates so that the 1976
Conference was not a total loss to the United States.76 However,
"depoliticization" and a return to "fundamental principles," on our
terms remained unachieved.
When the 1977 annual conference opened on June 1, the United
States was outwardly hopeful of achieving success in two key areas of
concern. First, it sought to have repealed the three year old resolution
which condemned Israel for "racial discrimination and violation of
trade union rights" in the occupied Arab territories. Second, it sought
a change in the standing orders of the Conference by which a body of
independent experts would screen politically motivated resolutions
unrelated to the organization's basic mission of safeguarding workers'
rights. That proposal also was designed to prohibit the condemnation
of ILO member states without a full advance hearing, and required
validation of charges by an impartial commission.
77
11 U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 34, at 6.
16 N.Y. Times, June 17, 1976, at 49, col. 6; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1976, at 1,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 19, 1976, at 27, Col. 2.
" Raskin, A Report on Worker Freedom and the Role of the U.S. in the ILO,
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1977, §4, at 5, col. 2; and N.Y. Times, June 2, 1977, at 10, col.
4. This issue pits our notion of procedural due process against the concept of freedom
of speech, which is also central to our Constitution. The delegates to the General Con-
ference believe that this freedom should apply to their deliberations. "Freedom of
speech is the life-blood of the International Labour Organization." Report IX to the
Int'l Labour Conference, 53rd Sess., at 178 (1969); 9th Agenda item, General Review
of the Reports of the Working Party on the Programme and Structure of the I.L.O.,
(ILO 1969). Procedure within the ILO is intimately tied to the structure of the ILO,
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Repeal failed, but the United States and Arab delegates reached a
compromise by which Director-General Blanchard himself was to in-
vestigate the conditions of Arab workers in the occupied territories.
That compromise was reached on June 9, 1977, but by the end of the
session a fortnight later, the agreement was rejected by the full con-
ference in a vote on the committee report.
78
The change in the standing orders of the conference, again proposed
by the United States [See Appendix II for the 1976 text of this pro-
posal], continued to meet Soviet bloc and Third World opposition.
These countries resisted what they viewed as American attempts to
restrict the freedom of speech of the conference. In a countermove by
the Third World "Group of 77" countries, it was proposed that the
United States changes be linked to proposals to alter the process for
amending the ILO Constitution, and replace non-elected seats on the
Governing Body with elected seats which would give wider representa-
tion to developing countries. The Soviets pursued a variant of this pro-
and the degree to which the powers of the various organs must be explicitly defined in
the Constitution. One of the tentative proposals of the working party on the structure
in 1975 was that "[t]he Conference should participate in the preparation of its agen-
da," even though the political consequences of this position, in American eyes, could
be highly undesirable and wasteful of the limited time and manpower resources of the
annual conference. Report IX of the Working Party on Structure to the Int'l Labour
Conference, 60th Sess. (1975). As Ray Marshall stated: "[T]he main purpose of the
ILO is to enforce labor standards . . .and too often the basic purpose was diverted by
extraneous political matters that were injected into the procedures of the ILO." Mar-
shall, supra note 5, at 2. How are free speech and procedural due process to be recon-
ciled? The debate was resolved in 1977. See Report VIII of the Working Party on
Structure to the Int'l Labour Conference, 61st Sess. (1976). Cf. Report of the Commit-
tee on Structure: Submission, Discussion and Adoption, and note the remarks of the
United Kingdom delegate at 3, and the remarks of the U.S. government delegate at 5;
i.e., "I intervene with great sadness .... [T]he continued lack of an amendment to
Article 17, which would set up criteria to insure that there could be no condemnation
without due process, has been one of basic disruptive elements causing so many dif-
ficulties in this Conference .... Let us not talk about new realities in the world as we
destroy that set of institutions so painfully developed by the ILO over the years to pro-
vide due process." The American position, apparently, is that its proposal is non-
negotiable. Thus it should not be a "bargaining counter with respect to other mat-
ters." Id. at 5. If the U.S. analysis of history is uniquely correct, its conclusion
necessarily follows. Yet there remains a lingering doubt as to just who will be responsi-
ble if the ILO does fall into the hands of one camp in the global arena. The question
stands that whether the U.S. government delegate who has represented the U.S. in this
issue under President Ford, is the logical candidate to execute the policy of the Carter
administration.
78 N.Y. Times, June 21, 1977, at 16, col. 1.
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posal, attempting to achieve geographically proportional representation
within the workers and employers groups of the conference, in par-
ticular with respect to the selection of the representatives of these
groups on the Governing Body. The Soviets claimed that without such
changes, these two groups of the tripartite ILO system unfairly ignored
the viewpoints of the communist social system's managerial and worker
groups. 7 9
The result of the strong debate within the Committee on Structure
was a decision with the consent of the full conference to refer the en-
tire matter to subsequent sessions of the Committee. The result avoided a
showdown, but at the expense of precluding any possibility of a vote
on the merits of the American proposal which might have kept the
United States in the ILO. The American worker's delegate referred to
the vote as "Black Monday."80
The response of the Carter Administration came from the voice of
Labor Secretary Marshall, who warned the world on June 23, 1977,
that the United States probably would quit the ILO now, despite at-
tempts by the Director-General to persuade it to remain a member."'
Despite Marshall's statement, debate continued within the Carter
Cabinet until the very end, as evidenced by U.N. Ambassador Andrew
Young's comment in July 1977 that most of the cabinet favored con-
tinued participation in the ILO.8 2 Such comments created a flurry of
renewed opposition to the ILO in the press and media by those groups
committed to withdrawal.8 "
The AFL/CIO, for years in charge of selecting the American
worker's delegate to the ILO, remained adamantly in favor of with-
drawal. When President Carter's statement of termination of member-
ship was published, George Meany stated, "We support and endorse
the decision of President Carter to stand by the notice of withdrawal
by the U.S. from the ILO."8' 4 But other concerned labor groups in the
United States felt otherwise. Arguably, given the declining membership
19 Raskin, supra note 77; Provisional Record, Int'l Labour Conference, 63rd Sess.,
at 35 (1977).
80 Provisional Record, supra note 79. The 1977 U.S. Delegation Report is not yet
available.
8' Deja Vu at the ILO, Wall St. J., June 28, 1977, at 16, col. 1.
82 N.Y. Times, July 5, 1977, at 14, col. 5.
13 Wall St. J., supra note 81; Failure of Nerve, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at 18, col.
1; U.S. Reported Ready to Leave the ILO, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
84 U.S. Membership in ILO Ends, AFL/CIO FREE TRADE UNION NEwS, Dec.,
1977, at 6.
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of AFL/CIO affiliated unions in recent years,"5 the voice of other labor
groups and unorganized workers in the United States should play a
greater role in decisions affecting American policy towards the only in-
ternational body concerned with the rights of labor. For example, the
United Auto Workers Union (UAW) shares the concern of all American
unions with anti-American rhetoric in international bodies such as the
ILO. But the UAW takes a broader view of the constructive role we
can play, providing we remain active in such bodies. As early as
August 3, 1977, UAW President, Douglas Fraser, urged President
Carter to decide in favor of continued United States participation in
the ILO:
I believe that the ILO has a significant role to play in the struggle of
workers for human rights across the world. If the United States with-
draws from the one international agency which has played such a
central role in promoting human rights for workers, our hope of im-
proving the lives of many will greatly diminish. . . .It is not clear to
me that our goals can, in any way, be furthered by withdrawal
[which] will provide those with whom we strongly disagree an
unobstructed path down which they will carry their effort to expand
their influence, particularly in developing countries. 86
The American business community, represented by the United
States Chamber of Commerce favored withdrawal. In a letter to the
President dated October 6, 1977, Chamber President Richard L.
Lesher expressed the view that the "ILO is not an effective mechanism
through which to promote human rights. . . . [T]he ILO is incapable
of implementing its constitution . .. [and] withdrawal could stimulate
reforms in the ILO and other U.N. organizations."87 Lesher listel six
positive results to expect if President Carter ordered withdrawal:
1) Withdrawal would emphasize your Administration's strong sup-
port of human rights.
2) Withdrawal would indicate a firmness in international relations
on the part of your Administration that would be welcomed by
most Americans.
85 ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1977, at 36-37; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS (1977).
16 NEWS FROM UAW, Aug. 3, 1977.
87 Wall St. J., supra note 81. See also letter from Richard L. Lesher, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce President, to the President of the United States (Oct. 3, 1977).
Interview with James F. Steiner, Director National Organization Liaison, United States
Chamber of Commerce (Dec. 19, 1977).
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3) Withdrawal could improve the ILO and other international
organizations. (It would stimulate reforms.)
4) Remaining in the ILO would be a political liability. (That is, if
the U.S. was to remain, its credibility would be seriously ques-
tioned, especially in light of the fact that the majority of involved
U.S. entities favor withdrawal.)
5) The U.S. could not bring about reform in the ILO by participa-
ting for one more year.
6) There is little or no evidence that the ILO has been effective in
improving living standards of workers of the United States or
anywhere else. 88
Numerous business groups believe that the ILO has not been effec-
tive in promoting Western ideas of labor-management relations.
Charles Smith, Jr., the American employers' delegate to the ILO, ad-
vocated full United States withdrawal.8 9
On November 1, 1977, President Carter directed that United States
membership in the ILO be terminated because the organization had
failed to take corrective measures to restore its commitment to its
original purpose. He left the door open, however, for an American
return "whenever the ILO is again true to its proper principles and
procedures."9°
Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall also issued a statement on the
United States withdrawal on November 1, 1977. He echoed the Presi-
dent, but promised affirmative action on the part of the Administra-
tion to monitor events in Geneva closely, with a view toward eventually
rejoining the ILO. 91
Marshall indicated United States withdrawal would not mean a
total cutoff of American funds to the ILO. Although the United States
no longer will be paying $20 million dollars a year to the ILO, it will
continue to contribute over $100 million per year to the United Na-
tions Development Program (UNDP). The UNDP distributes this
money to other United Nations agencies. According to Marshall, some
$35 million in technical assistance funds is given to the ILO each year
by the UNDP. Thus, the United States actually will be contributing in-
directly to the activities of the ILO.92
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 PRES. Doc., supra note 2.
91 Marshall, supra note 5.
92 Id. The UNDP is presently the clearing house for all U.N. development aid.
However, structural reform may soon improve its cost effectiveness and the supervision
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Confirming this announcement, Ambassador Melissa Wells, United
States Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, announced in the 1977 Pledging Conference of the UNDP
that "the United States contribution to the UNDP for the coming year
will be $115 million, or $15 million more than in 1977." Noting ar-
rearages and mounting contributions in nonconvertible currencies, Ms.
Wells stated:
My government's bilateral development assistance strategy increasing-
ly is being directed towards programs designed to help developing
countries meet the basic human needs of their poor majorities. We
note with pleasure that UNDP's efforts, in considerable measure, and
increasingly, have a similar focus. 93
The work of the UNDP is characterized by Ambassador Wells as sup-
portive of the human rights objectives of the Carter Administration.
Her terms can be shown to be identical to an appropriate characteriza-
tion of the work of the ILO. 94 This being the case, one is forced to
ask: What, despite the work of the ILO, can explain the United States
withdrawal?
There are two answers, one political and one institutional. The
political decision was to appease George Meany on a matter of impor-
tance to him, but with little domestic political salience. Second, the
of its aid programs. This is one of the main objectives of the Carter administration in
U.N. relations. Such reform of all U.N. agencies, including the ILO, is at the heart of
the cost-cutting, extravagance-challenging criticisms of international bodies in the re-
cent Ribicoff Committee Report, U.S. Participation in International Organizations,
supra note 8. Perhaps one latent issue in the U.S. withdrawal is the ILO's inefficiency
and the desire to demonstrate the limits of U.S. tolerance of the behavior of other
member nations in the U.N. and its affiliates. If ILO budget-cutting results in marked
improvements of ILO programming, the U.S. should consider rejoining the ILO. Such
improvements may take a long time, and will become apparent only if the U.S. does
not rejoin quickly for political reasons.
91 Statement of Nov. 2, 1977, by Melissa Wells, U.S. Representative to the U.N.
ECOSOC, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Press Release No. USUN-92 (1977).
94 See Developments in Major Programs, 31st Report of the ILO to the U.N.
(1977); G. WEAVER, supra note 20. Mr. Weaver was Assistant Secretary of Labor for
International Affairs and a U.S. delegate to the ILO. He delivered these lectures to
the Howard University School of Law in cooperation with American and George
Washington Universities in April and May of 1965. See also FREEDOM OF AssOCIA-
TION-DIGEST OF DECISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE
GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO (ILO 1972); H. BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ, PROTECTION
AGAINST ANTI-UNION DISCRIMINATION (ILO 1976); Human Rights and the ILO, Rep-
ly of the Director-General, 52nd Sess. Int'l Labour Conf. (1968); F. Wolf, supra note
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only difference between the ILO and the U.N. with its affiliated agen-
cies is the tripartite nature of ILO representation. Because the ILO
strives to go beyond governments and to incorporate the private sector,
the ILO is held to a higher standard of judgment by its Western
member states. 95 Although United States business and labor delegates
condemn the ILO for practicing a double standard in its relations with
market and socialist economies, in reality the West is guilty of a dou-
ble standard in abandoning the one international body which attempts
to combine universalism with the integration of private sector interests
into its program. To be consistent, either we should withdraw from all
international fora in which American interests and views are similarly
maligned or, preferably, we should recognize that the United Nations
and its affiliates can be a platform for politics in many nations. Such
political pronouncements are wholly irrelevant to the practical day to
day work of such bodies, where the real labor for building peace goes
on, and where we as a nation cannot afford to let our voice go
unheard 96
II.
With the withdrawal of the United States, and the apparent desire
of China either to withdraw or at least to cease active participation, 97
the ILO has an active membership of 134 or 133. Its institutional
structure, the cause of so much of its current woe, is thoroughly tripar-
tite in nature, which has caused considerable difficulty in the past in
its attempts to draft new labor standards. 9s The tripartite structure has
led to considerable debate about the proper mode of selection of ILO
delegates. The issue is whether they should be treated as represen-
tatives of their governments if they are nominally sent as workers' or
employers' representatives. 99
The thesis of this portion of the argument is that the ILO is a
Janus-faced being. It purports to give greater scope to private sector
interests than other international bodies, and to a large measure it has
11 See Marshall, supra note 5. Emphasis is placed on the uniqueness and
singularity of the ILO in explaining why United States withdrawal is not of preceden-
tial effect.
96 Cf. R. Smith, ILO-A Vital Role to Play, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Nov.
20, 1977, at 2, col. 1, (editorial).
91 Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
98 Wilson, The Preparation of International Labor Conventions, 28 AM. J. INT'L
L. 506 (1934).
99 Hudson, supra note 26.
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succeeded in doing so. But it is a realistic institution, drafted by
statesmen who understood international fora and power politics. It
therefore retains the state as its focus, and in effect gives each member
state the option to determine for itself how far it will go in fully im-
plementing what Kissinger terms the "fundamental principles" of the
Constitution. In so doing, the ILO seeks to bridge the gap between
organized and unorganized international society through transitional,
discretionary procedures. Its greatest failure is that by emphasizing its
own uniqueness, perhaps it has set for itself standards of excellence
which could not be met and which provide its critics the opportunity
to attack it.100
The three principal institutions of the ILO are identified in Article
2 of the Constitution:
The permanent organization shall consist of:
(a) a General Conference of representatives of the Members;
(b) a Governing Body composed as described in Article 7; and
(c) an International Labour Office controlled by the Governing
Body.10
The General Conference of the ILO serves as its legislative and
political arm. It meets annually in Geneva in June to discuss proposed
Conventions and Recommendations, receive reports and complaints,
and debate policy. 02 Each Member State sends a four-man delegation,
composed of two government delegates, one worker delegate, and one
employer delegate, with alternates and advisors as necessary for specific
agenda items. 0 3 These annual gatherings provide an opportunity for
informal meeting as well, which may serve to build ties of understand-
ing and cooperation without which no amount of formal debate can be
fruitful.
The Governing Body serves as a permanent executive body, com-
posed of 28 government representatives, 14 worker representatives, and
14 employer representatives. The worker and employer delegates are
selected by their respective groups under the principle known in the
ILO as "group autonomy," enshrined in Article 7(4) of the Constitu-
100 See, e.g., the extremely misguided editorial, The ILO and Goodbye, Man-
chester Guardian Weekly, Nov. 13, 1977, at 14, col. 4. See also Smith, supra note 96.
Professor Smith's letter is in reply to the above mentioned criticisms.
'0' ILO Constitution, art. 3.
102 G. JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at ch. IV; Bocksor, The ILO, 1973 PROC. AM.
SoCY INT'L L. 87.
103 LO Constitution, art. 3.
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tion. The government delegates are selected as set forth in Article 7(2):
ten non-elective positions to represent the nations of "chief industrial
importance" and the rest elected by and from among the remaining
members. The nations of "chief industrial importance" thus have been
singled out because they are likely to have the largest populations of
industrial laborers, traditionally the primary concern of ILO standard-
setting. Periodically they are selected by the Governing Body itself,
under Article 7(3), thus giving the Constitution a slight structural
weight in favor of advanced, industrial nations (which tend, in prac-
tice, to be the primary contributors to the ILO budget.)
One controversial aspect of these "nations of chief industrial impor-
tance" is found in Article 36 of the ILO Constitution. This provides
that the Constitution cannot be amended unless approved by two-
thirds of the votes cast at an annual conference, and then ratified by
two-thirds of all members including five of the ten nations of chief in-
dustrial importance. 0 4 Thus, regardless of changes in overall member-
ship, or in the political, economic, and social conditions of the
member countries, six of the ten permanent members of the Governing
Body can exercise a veto at least in theory, over constitutional amend-
ments.
The third major arm of the ILO is the permanent secretariat,
known as the International Labour Office. It is headed by a Director-
General, currently Francis Blanchard of France, who is selected by the
Governing Body. He supervises an international civil service of impar-
tial administrators, technical experts and legal advisors. Based in
Geneva, but with offices around the world, the International Labour
Office staffs the annual conference, administers the ILO budget, and
seeks to implement technical and vocational programs through expen-
ditures of funds made available not only by the ILO budget, but also
on a project basis from the United Nations Development Program.10 5
As of January 1977 the ILO staff numbered 2,803 persons of 102 na-
tionalities, who administered a budget of $79.6 million in 1977, as well
as an assessed two-year budget totalling $169 million for the years 1978
and 1979.106
The major work of the General Conference is to draft Conventions
and Recommendations, as is provided for in Article 19 of the Constitu-
tion. Both require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast by those pre-
104 See the debate in Provisional Record, supra note 79.
10 See note 92 supra.
106 BN 2-1, 2-2 (ILO Doc. 1977). See Appendix I.
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sent and voting in order to be approved and be sent to the member
states for ratification or implementation. Both have reporting re-
quirements designed to provide that the duty to seek ratification, at
least, is complied with in a reasonable time (Article 19(5)(b)), and that
information on compliance with ratified conventions is forthcoming
(Article 19(5)(d); Articles 20, 22, 23) for the benefit of the Con-
ference. 107
Of some interest in the United States is the "federal states" clause
of Article 19(7), which permits federal governments to comply with
their duties to the ILO by submitting Conventions to their states for
action rather than seeking federal ratification, Article 19(7)(b). Since
much labor and social legislation is traditionally deemed of state, or
joint state-federal, concern in the United States, the United States has
avoided the hardship of seeking ratification of ILO Conventions by
sending them off to the states, where no action is ever taken, thus
fulfilling its obligations in letter, if not in the spirit of the organiza-
tion. 0
Having ratified only seven of the ILO Conventions as of 1977, the
United States has one of the worst records of any ILO member, 0 9 a
fact recognized by Labor Secretary Marshall when he indicated:
Now, my own view is that we should have adopted more of them and
that there are other federal systems that did, and if we had stayed in
the ILO it was my intention to try to get more of those adopted in
the United States." 0
The United States, of course, has one of the highest standards of
living in the world, and one of the best records for freedom of associa-
tion, wages and hours, and conditions of labor, of any nation in the
world in or out of the ILO. Its labor law and system of labor relations
could be a model for other ILO members. Even though it has not
ratified most ILO conventions, it probably is fair to say that its prac-
tices are in compliance with, or better than, ILO standards in almost
every case. II'
107 See ILO Report to the U.N., supra note 94, at 5-8.
101 Note, supra note 4, at 636; Hudson, supra note 26.
10 Chart of Ratifications, supra note 31.
10 Marshall, supra note 5, at 4.
"I Hearings Before the Task Force on the ILO of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1968), reporting on the United States
Delegation to the 51st session of the ILO, June 1967. It should be noted that such con-
gressional reports are few and far between, despite the annual meeting of the labor
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This being so, and given that there are "virtually no matters of any
exigency, including human rights legislation, that Congress could not
pass even in the absence of a treaty," ' it would make sense for the
United States, if and when it rejoined the ILO, to consider wholesale
ratification of most ILO Conventions. Indeed, this prospect should
stand as a strong argument for rejoining the ILO at an early date, for
a number of reasons. Primarily, by lending its weight to the numbers
necessary to bring these Conventions into force, the United States
would contribute to the building of international law in the area of the
rights and standards of workers and working conditions. Secondly, this
would give added moral and political leverage to the United States in
and out of the ILO, in its pursuit of human rights. Thirdly, the
United States would be in a position to take the lead in suggesting new
areas for the articulation of universal labor standards.
The direct benefits to the United States, as well as to the interna-
tional system, of such a move would be numerous. There would be
enhancement of international human rights law through explicit
American support for the standard setting work of the ILO. Also, it
would provide the United States an opportunity for positive coalition
building which could spill over into other international bodies. Finally,
such development of international labor law would protect American
business and labor interests, by aiding in the gradual improvement of
world labor standards and associated labor costs. One cannot expect
other nations to take sudden steps drastically to increase their labor
costs unilaterally, especially in an era of recession and high unemploy-
ment. But just as the International Monetary Fund exists in part to
help nations avoid competitive depreciations of currency and beggar-
thy-neighbor monetary policy, so should the ILO be used to promote
higher labor standards on a universal basis despite the tendency of na-
tions in the developing world to seek to keep labor costs down as a
means of promoting exports.
Thus, if the United States were to rejoin the ILO at an early date,
it could seek higher international labor standards, and could en-
courage international competition based upon something other than
the exploitation of labor. Such gradual improvements as are feasible
are inherently in the interests of United States labor, and are explicitly
part of the ILO's Constitution:
conference. Whether congressional review is in fact, rarely exercised, the absence of
such review of ILO related matters is an example of congressional abdication which
has permitted the United States role in the ILO to deteriorate.
112 L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 147 (1972).
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PREAMBLE . . . Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt
humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other na-
tions which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries; ...
ANNEX (Declaration of Philadelphia), Article I: (c) poverty
anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere. 13
For example, if the workers of the United States wish to implement a
national health service in the United States, they cannot hope to do so
as long as other nations do not provide adequate health care (and,
therefore, appropriate revenues) for their workers. There is too much
concern about further reducing the competitiveness of United States
business. But Article 111(f) of the Declaration of Philadelphia provides
for the goal of "the extension of social security measures to provide a
basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive
medical care." Article III(g) calls for "adequate protection for the life
and health of workers in all occupations." A newly reconstituted
United States delegation to the ILO could seek to capitalize on this
language to the benefit of workers everywhere, including the United
States. It should be pointed out that President Carter's withdrawal
from the ILO said nothing to denigrate the continued commitment of
the United States to the goals laid down in the Constitution and Annex
of the ILO in 1934 and 1946. We have withdrawn for particular
political reasons and we can rejoin for the same sort of reasons, but
our commitment to the vision of the ILO remains unquestioned." 4
Once Conventions are in force, there is a problem of insuring that
states party to them respect their obligations, and pass and enforce ap-
propriate municipal laws. Unlike the European Community," 5 the
ILO is too broad in membership to pass detailed legislation itself, or to
have its own court in which to enforce it. It does, however, have an
extensive, quasi-legislative mandate in its sphere, and the most highly
developed enforcement mechanism of any of the U.N. agencies or
other international human rights organizations." 6
" Phil. Dec., supra note 25.
"l PRES. DOc., supra note 2.
"M A. PERRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW (1973); SWEET & MAXWELL'S EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY TREATIES (K. Simmonds ed. 1975); B. Rockwood, Labour Mobility and
Social Security in the European Community: A Study in Supranational Law Making
and Economic Policy (1974) (unpublished mansucript on file at the University of
Chicago Law School Library).
"I F. Wolf, supra note 37.
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The pertinent provisions in the Constitution of the ILO are found
in Articles 24 through 34, and provide for complaints of violations of
Conventions, Commissions of Enquiry, and action by the Governing
Body and the Annual Conference, including possible referral to the In-
ternational Court of Justice. The explicit sanctions are few: data may
be published, and information may be sought. But publicity, moral
suasion, and the limitation of enforcement to those Conventions (apart
from freedom of association), which have already been ratified by a
member, combine to provide a workable mix. The ultimate sanction is
the implicit possibility of expulsion from the organization: "The Gover-
ning Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it may
deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith."" 7
One unique element of the enforcement mechanism is the role
given to the private groups in the ILO. Article 24 provides that in "the
event of any representation being made to the International Labour
Office by an industrial association of employers or of workers" that a
member state has "failed to secure in any respect the effective obser-
vance within its jurisdiction of any Convention to which it is a party,"
the Governing Body may refer this matter to the party concerned,
and, if not satisfied with the reply, may publish the correspondence
under Article 25. Furthermore, the Governing Body may establish a
formal Commission of Enquiry upon complaint of any Convention
Delegate, including private group representatives, under Article 26, so
that "employers and workers who are represented on the Conference
delegations may make a complaint leading to the establishment of a
commission of inquiry." These procedures are an important precedent
in granting international status as subjects of international law to
private associations, to their conference delegates, and to individual
persons as well.1 8
Apart from the Constitutional mechanism for redress of com-
plaints, the ILO has a number of non-constitutional devices, including
an inquiry by a Committee of Experts empowered to make "observa-
tions," 119 which then may be considered by the Conference Committee
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations at the next
annual conference. This Committee, in turn, may obtain further infor-
mation, and make such reports as it chooses to the full Conference for
" ILO Constitution, art. 33.
"8 F. Wolf, supra note 37, at 23.
"9 Note, supra note 4, at 627-31.
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further action. In particular, "since 1957 the Conference Committee
has been empowered to single out for special reprobation in its report
• . . those nations which persistently have" violated either Conventions
or undertakings made to the inquiries.10
A third mechanism, complementing the Committee of Experts, is
that of the Governing Body's Committee on Freedom of Association,
which is empowered to investigate violations of the Convention on
Freedom of Association, one of the fundamental objectives of the
ILO.121
All of these mechanisms are limited, of course, by the fact that
they, cannot be used to investigate charges against nations which simply
refuse to ratify the pertinent Conventions.
The United States complains that developments since World War
II have weakened severely the ILO's tripartite structure. Secretary Kiss-
inger, in his letter of intent to withdraw, stated in relevant part:
The Constitution of the ILO is predicated on the existence within
member states of relatively independent and reasonably self-directed
worker and employer groups. The United States fully recognizes that
these assumptions, which may have been warranted on the part of
the Western democracies which drafted the ILO Constitution in
1919, have not worked out everywhere in the world; in truth only a
minority of the nations of the world today have anything resembling
industrial democracy, just as only a minority can lay claim to
political democracy. . . . [R]evising the practices and arrangements
of the ILO is not going to restore the world of 1919 or of 1944. It
would be intolerable for us to demand that it do so. On the other
hand, it is equally intolerable for other states to insist that as a con-
dition of participating in the ILO we should give up our liberties
simply because they have another political system. We will not. Some
accommodation will have to be found. But if none is, the United
States will not submit passively to what some, mistakenly, may sup-
pose to be the march of history. In particular, we cannot accept the
Workers' and Employers' Groups in the ILO falling, under the
domination of governments. 122
120 Id. at 629; E. LANDY, supra note 31, at 102. The author examines the prob-
lem of retrogression from accepted standards such as those against forced labor by new
nationi in the name of development goals. See also THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (ILO 1976).
121- Id.
122 Kissinger, supra note 4, at 1582 (emphasis added).
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The substance of the United States complaint is that the non-
government delegates from non-Western states no longer -are chosen
freely to represent worker and employer interests, but rather operate as
agents of their governments. Compounded by the increase in non-
Western states over the years since 1946, the 22 Member States
characterized by the United States Chamber of Commerce as 'tin-
dustrialized, market economy countries (IMEC)"' 2 have been put at
an extreme voting disadvantage in the annual Conference. The effec-
tive extension of governmental control over labor and employer
delegates from many non-European states also means that freely
elected labor and employer delegates in fact may be unable to control
their own "group" in subsequent Annual Conferences, thus giving non-
Western Member States direct and indirect voting control over the
Governing Body of the ILO, despite the tripartite selection procedure
for that institution set forth in Article 7 of the Constitution.
How valid is this American complaint? In particular, is Secretary
Kissinger's argument that, while we cannot change history, we none-
theless must defend group autonomy within the Conference against
government domination, an historically and legally defensible position?
Article 3 of the ILO Constitution provides that each member state
shall send four delegates, two selected by the government of the day,
and one each selected to represent the workers and employers of the
Member State. The language of Article 3(1) provides: "of whom two
shall be Government delegates, and the two others shall be delegates
representing respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of
the Members." The phrase "representing" would seem to suggest,
without compelling, the interpretation of Secretary Kissinger and the
IMEC countries, that these latter delegates be in some sense selected
by the groups in question, with some degree of independence.
Article 3(5) provides, however, only that the "Members undertake
to nominate non-Government delegates and advisers chosen in agree-
ment with the industrial organization, if such organizations exist,
which are most representative of employers or workpeople, as the case
may be, in their respective countries." (emphasis added) If such
organizations do not exist, or if the appropriate organizations in a
Member State are for all practical purposes agents of the state ap-
paratus or of the ruling political party, there is nothing in Article 3 to
preclude said state from being permitted to join the ILO and sending
whomever it wishes to represent the workers' and employers' (i.e., the
labor and commerce branches of the state) interests in the ILO.
123 R. Lesher, supra note 87, at 4.
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That this interpretation of Article 3 is the correct one is deduced
from the fact of membership of many one-party states in the ILO, and
the very claims of the various Western states that these nations violate
the spirit of tripartism.1 24 The fact is, freedom in the world is in a
poor way according to Western conceptions, and if every nation which
lacked genuinely independent unions or businessmen were barred from
participating in the ILO, it would be little more than a club of in-
dustrial states with little or no need for guidance in industrial rela-
tions. 125
Of course, Article 3 does seem to be anomalous. It poses more of a
burden upon free societies than on authoritarian ones, since it man-
dates, by its terms, consultation only if there is any independent body
to consult with. If there is no such body, there is no need to consult.126
On the other hand, to read it this way is, perhaps, to miss the point.
The Constitution of the ILO does not require, as a condition of
membership, that nations operate on an industrialized, free market
economy basis. It does, however, seek to promote peace through the
improvements of a class of society which cuts across national boun-
daries, the working class. It recognizes that, regardless of the political
and social structure within societies and states, there are persons who
may be characterized primarily as government functionaries, commer-
cial or industrial executives, and laboring persons or workpeople.
Therefore, it requires a functional, tripartite approach to the conduct
of business within the ILO, regardless of the internal structure of the
member states.
124 Cf. Hudson, supra note 26.
125 Freedom at Issue, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1977, at 12, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec.
25, 1977, at 11, col. 1; Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1977, at 8, col. 1. These Freedom House
statistics reflect an essentially western civil libertarian definition of freedom and are
heavily relied upon by Senator Moynihan at various times. Their accuracy and mean-
ing in historical context is open to discussion.
126 Mr. Coates, of the United Kingdom employers' delegation, stated at the 1977
Labour Conference: "I would just like to add my feeling that there is little point in
bringing tripartite delegations to Geneva if they only speak with a single voice because
of political considerations. Tripartism does not seem to work in politics." Provisional
Record, supra note 79, at 11. Can this be true? Mr. Steiner of the Chamber of Com-
merce believes individual employers from Third World countries have been threatened
by their government delegates and compelled to vote as directed. J. Steiner, supra note
87. Even so, in the technical work of the conference it is likely that delegates for
worker or employer interests within any society will have a different viewpoint. The
ILO postulates tripartism as a working hypothesis for some members, and a goal for
all others. The ILO should not be criticized because the global community does not,
at present, live up to all of its ideals.
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As a consequence, it would seem to this writer that the complaint
of government dominance of non-governmental delegates in third
world or socialist states is misplaced. As long as the appropriate func-
tional representation of the three "tripartite" groups occurs in the ILO
technical discussions of Conventions, Recommendations, and Reports,
it is not constitutionally significant how they were chosen at home.
Furthermore, Article 3(8) provides that the names of delegates
shall be channeled through the member state to the International
Labour Office by the Government. Thus, if the Government declines to
submit a name, an otherwise qualified worker or employer may not at-
tend the Conference. This policy is followed, in fact, by the United
States, in its requirement of security screening of potential delegates, to
assure that none of them are Communists or Communist sympathizers. 27
Additionally, there has been some criticism in the past of the way
in which a small group of American trade unionists has dominated the
attitude of American labor towards the ILO, to the exclusion of those
who might wish to make use of its opportunities in other than political,
cold war terms. While the AFL/CIO is nominally the representative of
the largest group of trade unionists in this country, it has done little to
translate that into constructive policy designed to put the ILO to use
for the benefit of American labor. Thus, the American Chamber of
Commerce President was truthfully able to write to President Carter on
October 3, 1977:
While some persons and groups may find reasons to justify continu-
ing participation, the "most representative" organizations of
employers and workers have said they want out. These organizations
have participated in the working meetings of the ILO for more than
thirty years. They are well able to judge the merit of the ILO, or the
lack of it. Lacking a significant constituency for continuing participa-
tion, the ILO is a political "loser" for the Administration, and for
United States foreign policy. 1
It is remarkable that, after more than forty years of United States in-
volvement in the ILO, with the United States in the forefront of im-
proving the conditions of labor in the free world, that there should, in
fact, be no "significant constituency" for the only international institu-
tion dedicated to improving labor conditions in other countries.
Perhaps both American business and labor are at fault in their own
127 J. Steiner, supra note 87. See 94 CONG. REC. 8172 (1948); S.J. Res. 117, § 3,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
" R. Lesher, supra note 87, at 3.
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priorities, and are now only too glad to "forget" the tremendous need
that exists beyond our borders. It is not clear, however, that such
parochialism, draped in the flag of "tripartism," should provide the
basis for United States Government policy on this matter.
This is not to downplay entirely the seriousness of the dispute over
the meaning of tripartism. Tripartism has important symbolic and
practical implications for the ILO, as well as being a source of con-
troversy. Its symbolic value lies, like its procedures with respect to
lodging complaints against violations of Conventions, in the standing it
gives to nongovernmental entities. Even unitary states must send
tripartite delegations. In doing so, they are forced to recognize, inter-
nationally, the legal status of private associations of private persons, as
possessed of international legal personality, legal rights and obliga-
tions. Thus, the ILO's tripartite, functional division of representation
serves as a wedge upon which the admittedly weak international legal
standing of the individual, and his human rights, has been built into
the evolving United Nations system. I2 9
Furthermore, as a practical matter, tripartism permits Western, in-
dustrial societies greater leverage within the ILO than they would
otherwise have on a straight, one-state, one-vote basis. Strange as it
may seem, the ILO's political activities which have so alienated the
American delegation, are restrained rather than enhanced by the pre-
sent Constitutional structure. While proposed changes in the rules
under which each group selects its membership on the Governing Body
of the ILO could result in a reduction in Western influence, these pro-
posals have thus far been defeated, just as our own proposals to reform
'the ILO in "our direction" have also been defeated through procedural
devices.0130 Of course, now that the United States no longer is a
member of the ILO, the chances would seem good that any changes in
the ILO system will drive it away from, rather than towards, the sort
of "accommodation" sought in the Kissinger letter.
Apart from affecting the structure of the Governing Body and
various committees of the ILO, tripartism has a considerable legitimiz-
ing effect in Member States with respect to those Conventions and
Recommendations which actually are adopted. Just because the delega-
tions must divide along functional lines and prepare separate reports
from the three perspectives mandated, the documents resulting from
this process are more likely to take into account realistic appraisals of
129 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 122-25, 292 (6th ed. 1963).
110 Provisional Record, supra note 79.
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what is desirable, and what is possible, in the Member States. Addi-
tionally, tripartite drafting ought to make it easier to attain ratification
of conventions in those states which have viable political processes,
where the comments of the workers and employers organizations could
have. an influence on the domestic result. In turn, this political
credibility in the Member States tends to lend legal authoritativeness to
such documents as the International Labour Code, both as prescrip-
tion, and as a source of developmental guidance for new states.' 3 '
But it is the role of tripartism as a source of controversy, that has
of necessity most concerned us in this article, because of its invocation
in the litany of abuses raised by partisans of withdrawal. The other
three objections of Secretary Kissinger in his letter of intent, and more
specific complaints against the ILO with regard to the attitude of the
International Labour Conference towards the Palestine Liberation
Organization, really only reflect the concerns which have been raised
here-that the Western, market-oriented, democratic states are in-
creasingly outvoted in the organization, despite their importance in
contributing the largest shares of the ILO budget, and that the
policies announced by the Annual Conference are therefore not in
keeping with the perceived interests of those states. Identifying as they
do with their own interpretation of tripartism and of the goals of the
ILO, as conceived when it was founded, the United States finds it in-
creasingly difficult to accept current realities. This difficulty surely
must be shared by the business and labor delegates from the United
States. Even though many of these individuals may have long ex-
perience in the ILO and in dealing with international labor problems,
they are not professional diplomats, and in the very process of being
complete advocates of their private causes they may fail to see beyond
the immediate, political rhetoric to the real, long term interests of the
United States, or the policy as communicated by a newly elected ad-
ministration.
For example, the Kissinger letter criticizes the ILO for being selec-
tive in whom it attacks for violations of human rights, and for doing so
Although the annual Chart of ILO Ratifications published by the ILO makes
clear that few nations are bound vis a vis each other by any particular Convention,
many nations have ratified numerous Conventions, and the entire body has been com-
piled in a systematically arranged two-volume set. THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
CODE-1951 (ILO 1952). If revised in light of new Conventions, and annotated by
reference to national legislation and practice, and the work of other international
organizations, this code approach to international labor "legislation" could lend added
weight and cohesiveness to the work of the ILO in the future.
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in the General Conference in disregard of the findings of the Commit-
tee of Experts, or of other appropriate ILO bodies. Query: Why
should we pick out one institution of the ILO, the General Con-
ference, and denounce the whole organization for the faults of one
phase of that institution's deliberations? If the Committee of Experts,
the Governing Body, and other groups within the ILO structure are in
fact fair and objective, should we not emphasize that fact in our
analysis, and thus discount the outbursts of delegates and groups for
what they really are?
Furthermore, although it is unfair in theory to attack only certain
states for actions of which many are guilty, in practice there is no
other way to focus the energies of such an institution to have any ef-
fect. Assuming Israel and Chile are guilty of some human rights viola-
tions, for whatever reason, and assuming further that the make-up of
the Governing Body is such that neither Israel nor Chile could ever be
cited for violations of rights by the appropriate committees, it does not
follow that those violations do not exist at all. "Due process" is a valid
concept, but the process itself must be fair, and perceived as fair. It
may be open to further research, at least, as to whether or not viola-
tions in Western societies actually could ever be the subject of formal
action in the Governing Body and the various committees, as presently
constituted, any more than violations of Soviet or Third World Coun-
tries are likely to be criticized in the final voting of the General Con-
ference. Unless the Conference is to be a tool of the committees and
the Governing Body, it is not unreasonable that it should have the
power to add to its own agenda. We should recognize that and accept
it as such, observing that if, societies such as Israel and Chile are likely
to pay more heed to criticism of this sort than either the Soviets or
South Africa, for example, then some individuals may in the end
benefit regardless of the political injustice of such "selective" attacks. 32
The ILO does not have weighted voting, as does the International
Monetary Fund.' Its structure, for good or ill, reflects the common-
132 Consider the recent referendum in Chile provoked by U.N. condemnation of
Chilean policies. While it may have been predetermined in outcome, it demonstrates
Chilean sensitivity to international criticism. See, e.g., Buckley, Chile's Chief Has
Right to be Irked, Toledo Blade, Jan. 11, 1978, at 21, col. 1; Israelis Accused of
Beating Palestinians, The Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Jan. 13, 1978, at 8A, col. 1.
"I Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. XII(5)(a) & (b). See
Selected Dec. of the International Monetary Fund and Selected Documents, 8th Issue,
Decision No. 180-5, June 25, 1947, at 161 (1976); and A. LOWENFELD, The Interna-
tional Monetary System, in 4 INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC LAW (1977).
[Vol. 10:359
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS
place formula of one-state, one-vote, even though that formula is
obscured by the tripartite system of shares and the residual powers of
the nations of "chief industrial importance." Although this system does
not reflect the realities of power politics, it does reflect the current law
of the international system, which advocates respect for the sovereign
equality of nations.3 4 Our choice is not whether to change this, but to
work with it, to promote fairness and respect for equal treatment in
like cases. A decision in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to
consider fully the case of human rights violations in Uganda would be
a step in the right direction in this respect. There seems no reason in
principle why such progress ought not to be possible in the forum pro-
vided by the ILO system.
A compromise formula to achieve American and European Com-
munity objectives in the ILO may well be achieveable. If the West
were to agree to the elimination of the "veto" in Article 36 of the Con-
stitution of Constitutional Amendments belonging to the nations of
chief industrial importance, this would eliminate the last vestige of
legal "inequality" for member states of the ILO. If this offer were
coupled with Western support for more representation of the lesser
developed nations (LDC) on the Governing Body and various industrial
committees of the ILO, and Western support for taking greater ac-
count of differences in circumstances of LDC's with respect to their
abilities to meet global labor standards (as is already provided for in
Article 19(3) of the Constitution),'13 we well might receive in exchange
LDC support for rejecting any interference in the "group autonomy"
of the employers and workers groups, including avoidance of any for-
mal geographical quota system. This would deny the Soviets their ma-
jor objectives in the ILO at present.
134 See Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, art. 5, Report of the In-
ternational Law Commission, 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) 7, U.N. Doc. A/925
(1949). "Every State has the right to equality in the law with every other State." Id.
But see the distinction between legal and political sovereignty in G. SCHWARZENBERGER
& E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1976).
135 ILO Constitution, art. 19(3). This article provides "In framing any Convention
or Recommendation of general application the Conference shall have due regard to
those countries in which climactic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial
organization, or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantial-
ly different and shall suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may be re-
quired to meet the case of such countries." The tendency in recent U.N. and U.N.-
agency documents to phrase proposals for improvement in terms of "progressive
development" rather than immediate compliance is a sensible compromise in line with
this analysis.
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The language necessary to adapt labor standards to the exigencies
of individual countries and their developmental needs, can be found in
formulae such as "progressive attainment" of certain logically con-
nected, and gradually more advanced, labor standards. If they were
phrased in terms of discrete periods of time for progression from one
stage to the next, dated from the time of accession by the individual
member in question, the successful experience of the European Com-
munity in the gradual implementation of transnational standards in
labor and social matters, as well as trade issues, might well be
emulated by the ILO. 136
Support for the developmental approach to human rights, and the
development aims of the United Nations system, already has been
observed in the statements of Secretary Marshall and Ambassador
Wells, supra. It would be consistent with the entire approach of the
Carter Administration towards human rights in the rapidly changing
international system of the last quarter of the 20th century to under-
take a reappraisal of its attitude towards the ILO. The Administration
should seek undertakings by that body and its members to support a
strategy, such as is outlined above, together with assurances for fairer
action at the Conference with respect to consideration of charges of
violations of ILO Conventions, so that proper procedures will be
followed in the future.
Even if such undertakings amount to less than a 100% guarantee
that we shall achieve all our objectives 13 immediately, we then should
announce that ILO budgetary cutbacks are consistent with our own
goals in making the U.N. system more lean and efficient," 8 and that
we have determined that in the interests of avoiding significant institu-
tional harm being done to the ILO in the absence of our vote at the
next Conference, we best can "monitor" the progress of the ILO as ac-
tive participants in its work.
136 B. Rockwood, supra note 115.
1' "We cannot alter the fact that ILO activities involve politics. All social pro-
blems are necessarily political problems." Provisional Record, supra note 79, at 2 (Mr.
Muhr, West German Workers' Delegate).
138 COMM. REPORT, supra note 8. See Statement of Congressman Lester L. Wolff,
United States Representative in Committee Five, on the scale of assessments for appor-
tionment of the expenses of the U.N., Press Release No. USUN-82 (Oct. 21, 1977);
Statement by Congressman Wolff, on the budget program of the U.N. for 1978-79,
Press Release USUN-149 (Oct. 20, 1977); U.S. Criticizes U.N. on Waste in Budget,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1977, at A13, col. 6.
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Such a strategy would place our withdrawal from the ILO in pro-
per context, as a political act designed to make a point. A point has in
fact been made, without totally abandoning all hope of rehabilitating
and using its widely recognized and respected machinery for the pro-
tection of labor rights through labor standards and development pro-
grams. This strategy is rendered more persuasive when we examine the
Carter Administration's human rights strategy in detail, and seek to
reconcile our actions to date regarding the ILO, with our overall
strategy for global human rights.
The cornerstone of President Carter's foreign policy is a commit-
ment to an aggressive, internally consistent, and flexible human rights
offensive. Even before he was sworn into office, it was clear that his
foreign policy would be based on a systematic articulation of American
human rights objectives. The New York Times editorialized on January
11, 1977:
We shall soon have an Administration in Washington that is pledged
to give human rights a central place in its foreign policy. We
welcome that change from recent practice, understanding that it
raises some extraordinarily difficult questions. 39
Going beyond mere words, Carter called for enhanced public
visibility for the United Nations Human Rights Commission, and ex-
plicitly recognized the link between human rights and development "to
bring greater prosperity" to the people of all countries. 140 In his March
17, 1977 speech to the Permanent Representatives of the United Na-
tions, only eight weeks into his term of office, President Carter clearly
articulated this commitment to human rights, and to the U.N. system:
The search for peace and justice means also respect for human
dignity. All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged themselves
to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the
United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its
own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to
1'9 N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1977, at 32, col. 1.
140 Pres. Carter, Arms, Economic Prosperity, and Human Rights, speech before
the Permanent Representatives of the United Nations (Mar. 17, 1977), reprinted in
Dep't State News Release (Bureau of Public Affairs); full text in N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1977, at A20, col. 1; Carter Calls on U.N. to Honor Its Pledges, Wall St. J., Mar. 18,
1977, at 7, col. 1. See the initial discussion, support and criticism of the Carter policy
at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., San Francisco, Apr. 1977;
Human Rights as New Policy by a New Administration, 1977 PROC. AM. SOCY INT'L
L. 68.
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review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs
in any part of the world.
The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal
demand for fundamental human rights. The United States has a
historical birthright to be associated with this process.'4
Following up on this speech, the Carter Administration's legal acts
in this area included the signature of the American Convention on
Human Rights, on June 1, 1977, at the Pan American Union, 14 2 and
the signature of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, at the Economic and Social Chamber of the United
Nations, on October 5, 1977. 14
Even as he announced United States withdrawal from the ILO,
Carter spoke before the World Jewish Congress and noted the intimate
connection between his human rights objectives, and the religious and
spiritual connections which he believes bind America and the rest of
the world in the quest for peace.
In large measure, the beginnings of the modern concept of human
rights go back to the laws and the prophets of the Judeo-Christian
tradition. I have been steeped in the Bible since early childhood, and
I believe that anyone who reads the ancient words of the Old Testa-
ment with both sensitivity and care will find there the idea of govern-
ment as something based on a voluntary covenant rather than force;
the idea of equality before the law and the supremacy of law over the
whims of any ruler; the idea of the dignity of the individual human
being and also of the individual conscience; the idea of service to the
poor and to the oppressed. . . . This organization has made a major
contribution to insuring that human rights became a part of the
Charter of the United Nations as one of its three basic purposes,
along with the preservation of peace and economic progress . . . no
government can now pretend that its mistreatment of its own citizens
is merely an internal affair. . . . The public demonstration of our
own government's commitment to human rights is one of the major
goals that my Administration has set for U.S. foreign policy. The em-
phasis on human rights has raised the level of consciousness around
141 Pres. Carter, supra note 140. Secretary of State Vance's remarks parallel those
of the President, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (1977).
141 75 DEPT STATE BULL. 28 (1977).
141 75 DEPT STATE BULL. 586 (1977).
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the world and is already beginning to help overcome the crisis of the
spirit which recently has afflicted the nations of the West.1 44
And as the first year of the Carter Administration wound to a
close, Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr., a member of the United
States Mission to the 32nd Session of the United Nations, reaffirmed
the administration's stand at the commemoration of Human Rights
Day, December 9, 1977: "This year President Carter has made human
rights a cornerstone of his foreign policy."' 45
In his signature of the several human rights covenants, and his em-
phasis on the United Nation's human rights machinery, President
Carter has recognized that human rights can and must be translated
from political confrontation into legal issues properly of concern in in-
ternational, legal fora. In fact, the principle of legality is a fundamen-
tal basis for understanding the steps Carter has taken. As Article 29(2)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the pur-
pose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others .. . 146
Thus, Arthur W. Rovine, Assistant Legal Adviser in the Depart-
ment of State, has emphasized the centrality of Senate ratification of
the Human Rights treaties and the Genocide Convention in his state-
ment to the American Society of International Law in April 1977,
noting that their ratification
would require this country to grapple with norms accepted by the
rest of the world, including economic, cultural, and social rights. [In
addition] . . . the agreements give the United States an additional
forum in which to argue its positions; . . . they establish norms for
domestic protection of human rights ... [and] an international law
continues to become intertwined with domestic law, the conventions
144 U.S. Responsibilities toward Peace and Human Rights, Dep't State News
Release (Nov. 2, 1977) (emphasis added).
141 U.S. Mission to the U.N., Press Release No. USUN-144 (1977).
146 The test of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is conveniently
reprinted in many sources. See DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, at 45 (N. Leech, C. Oliver & J. Sweeney eds.
1973); U.N. Office of Public Information Pamphlet OPI-15-18574-Sept. 1973-150M.
The principle of legality in the covenants is analyzed in Garibaldi, General Limitations
on Human Rights: The Principle of Legality, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503 (1976).
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serve to increase the effectiveness and the efficiency of the composite
regime. 147
The Carter policy accepts the Moynihan thesis that the U.N.
Charter clearly does mandate acceptance of "liberal" social systems by
its members.14 8 But Carter applies a logical corollary, which Moynihan
misses, that in order to enforce the law, we need to be full partners in
the international legal machinery, thus creating the urgency of full
Senate ratification of the three noted conventions. Further, this under-
scores the recognition by Carter that human rights perhaps is a more
complicated notion than Mr. Moynihan would care to acknowledge
publicly at this time; and that a multiplicity of fora is useful for
debate even if the United States is likely to be consistently out-
numbered and outvoted at the close of debate.149
Furthermore, the conventions all serve to "establish norms" in in-
ternational and municipal law which can be used to enhance the ac-
tual rights of peisons. It is curious to note, therefore, that all three of
these points-the complexity of the definition of rights, the need for
fora for debate, and the need to build legal norms even in the face of
weak or biased enforcement- argue equally for remaining in and
working with the International Labour Organization and its human
rights programs.
President Carter has shown, by word and deed, a more finely honed
understanding of the complex meaning of the term human rights than
most of his critics.15 0 He clearly relates human rights to peace, justice,
and dignity, and speaks of "torture or unwarranted deprivation" as be-
ing equally violative of human rights. In his March 17th speech, he
clearly was recognizing as human rights a complex of several distinct
types of rights which are capable of discrete analysis, ranking, and
discussion concerning their degree of importance and actual, "univer-
sal" recognition. '5 1
"4' PROC. AM. SOc'Y INT'L L, supra note 140, at 68-71.
'48 Moynihan, supra note 18, at 465. The author restates his opinion in The
Politics of Human Rights; COMMENTARY, Aug. 1977, at 19.
1' The Lima News, Apr. 30, 1977, at 20, col. 1. This article contains an inter-
view with the outgoing Human Rights Division Director of the U.N., Marc Schreiber.
See also Nossiter, U.N. Bias on Human Rights, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec.
11, 1977, at 15, col. 3.
10 Pres. Carter, supra note 140, at 3.
" Definitions and Possibilities on Human Rights, Manchester Guardian Weekly,
May 15, 1977, at 16, col. 1.
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Senator Moynihan clearly thinks the President has overemphasized
developmental goals, and underplayed the concerns of civil and
political liberties, in his human rights push."5 2 While Professor Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., has noted that raising the issue of human rights im-
mediately raises matters of application which may not, and, indeed, do
not leave the United States untouched.15 3 The United States, the
Western European states, and the Soviet Bloc states all have
acknowledged similar obligations in the Helsinki Final Act's recogni-
tion of the interdependence of "civil, political, economic, social,
cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the in-
herent dignity of the human person.' u5 4
The meaning of these rights, and the capacity of the international
system to enforce them, is the subject of the recently concluded talks
at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, reviewing the results of the Helsinki Con-
ference. Beyond the European and Atlantic context, the universality of
these rights in non-Western terms may be somewhat in doubt. 55
Nonetheless, their universal, legal effect is assured by the acquiescence
of all states of the United Nations in the Charter and the several subse-
quent United Nations human rights conventions. This legal effect may
depend upon voluntary cooperation for its enforcement or for the
enhancement of its effectiveness. 5 6 The principles of international law
of consent and acquiescence, and the plain meaning rule of interpreta-
tion of treaties, all operate together to demonstrate that the member
states of the United Nations have undertaken affirmatively to uphold
12Moynihan Charges Carter Is Neglecting East-West Conflict, N.Y. Times, June
10, 1977, at A5, col. 1. The article reports Senator Moynihan's speech at Baruch Col-
lege where he formed the basis for his August article in Commentary. He charged
Carter with ignoring the "central political struggle of our time-that between liberal
democracy and totalitarian Communism." However, it is the thesis of this article that
by continuing to focus on the East-West conflict to the exclusion of other important
issues, it is Moynihan, not Carter, who is ignoring the real "war of the future." See
Dahrendorf, International Power: A European Perspective, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 72
(1977).
151 Schlesinger, Human Rights: How Far, How Fast?, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1977,
at 10, col. 4.
'4 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Principle
VII: The Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States, §
1(a): Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 73 DEP'T STATE BULL.
323 (1975); 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1293 (1975).
"I Berger, Are Human Rights Universal? COMMENTARY, Sept. 1977, at 60.
Ie G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN. supra note 134, at 258.
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all these general sorts of rights in accordance with international law
and their own municipal law. 5 7
Perhaps because of an increased, global recognition of factual in-
terdependence on a variety of levels, the legal status of the United Na-
tions Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 has become
stronger since Brierly commented that
it was not intended to be a legal instrument binding on members.
Nevertheless, it has gained considerable authority as a general guide
to the content of fundamental rights and freedoms as understood by
members of the United Nations, and it is important as providing a
connecting link between different concepts of human rights in dif-
ferent parts of the world. 151
The speech of the United States U.N. Ambassador, Andrew
Young, to the concluding session of the 32nd United Nations General
Assembly would seem to support this view.' 5 9
Thus, President Carter's remarks in March 1977 may be seen, in
context, as evidence of acceptance by the United States of the position
that human rights guarantees of the United Nations system spell out
legally effective duties, obligations, and rights which the international
legal system must observe and protect.
The content of these legal duties needs to be further specified in
order to comprehend the incongruity of the Carter rights initiative
with his action in regard to the ILO. Once it is seen that the decision
to withdraw was based primarily on domestic politics, that its interna-
tional point (that we mean what we say) has been made sufficiently,
and that there is more to be lost than gained by continuing to remain
outside, then the next step can be a return to the ILO in strength to
continue to carry out the overall Administration rights policy. 160
17 Id. at 21-27, 118-21, 133-35.
158 J. BRIERLY, supra note 129, at 294.
159 Ambassador Andrew Young noted that there was in the U.N. an "emerging
agreement that the time for opportunism on many issues before the U.N. is passing.
The issues are to pressing, the dangers are too great." United States Mission to the
U.N. Press Release No. USUN-150, at 5 (1977).
160 A survey of the Department of State Bulletin for 1977 reveals no formal, writ-
ten record of any policy debate within the Carter administration concerning the merits
of withdrawal. This absence is in striking contrast to the numerous articles on other in-
ternational topics of current importance. Possibly this was a deliberate move to create
the appearance of harmony. There is, however, no basis in the record for judging the
likelihood of any further move to rejoin the ILO. Presumably the United States would
wish further concrete moves by the ILO to appease American complaints, but is this
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Human rights, from the perspective of the international legal
system, is a sometime thing, weakly established despite the binding
declarations of nations, and many times honored in the breach.16 ' The
primary purpose of international law has been the avoidance of, or
control of war. 16 2 The rights of individuals always have been approach-
ed with circumspection in international discussions, because they are
likely to raise questions which inflame passions on a transnational
scale, and thus weaken, rather than sustain, the primary goal of the
traditionally conceived international legal system, the maintenance of
peace.
President Carter, however, has perceived one of the fundamental,
threshhold realities of the last quarter of the 20th century, that human
rights are an intrinsic requirement for the just society, including the
just international society, and that peace and justice are indivisible
phenomena. There can be no peace without justice. As a necessary
corollary, there can be no justice unless justice is defined in universally
acceptable terms, including the human rights component of justice.163
President Carter's statements, and those of his administration's
spokesmen on these matters, clearly demonstrate a commitment to a
more likely to occur without the American vote in the ILO? The loss of the United
States 25% budgetary contributions was a blow to the ILO, but not unanticipated,
and the ILO did survive from 1919 to 1934 without United States membership. It is
more likely that our self-imposed exile will last as long as we choose to permit it.
Meanwhile, the Third World majority in the ILO is able to promote its views
unhampered by the presence of a committed and articulate American delegation.
"I1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN. supra note 134, at 14, 84, 90, 282; J.
STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69, 357-64 (7th ed. 1972).
The author comments: "The formulation of binding general rules of international law
for the protection of human rights ... remains more a promise than an achievement."
See also J. BRIERLY, supra note 129, at 292-99, 403. The existence of binding interna-
tional legal duties respecting human rights is now conceded, and the true distinction is
not between goals and binding rules, but between binding rules and their enforce-
ment.
1'2 Thus, the origins of the modern attempt to structure international legal order
by treaty began with the 1907 Hague Conventions, and these were subject to the
classic "joker-in-the-deck", self-defense. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, supra
note 134, at ch. 7. Starke notes that "[t]he main object of international law has been
to produce an ordered rather than a just system." J. STARKE, supra note 161, at 3. Yet
he notes a more recent trend towards seeking justice among states. Id. at 3-4. The
Carter human rights policy seeks to avoid war by striking at its cause in human misery
and underdevelopment, in distinct parallel with the ILO's Declaration of Philadelphia.
'63 See discussion in J. STARKE, supra note 161, at 3-4; Human Rights and the
"Single Standard," N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1977, at 32, col. 1.
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tripartite definition of human rights designed to meet this requirement
of universal acceptability.
For example, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
speaking before the August 1977 meeting of the American Bar
Association, stated that human rights must be defined to include:
First, the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity
of the person. Such violations include torture; cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprison-
ment; denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home . . .
Second, the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food,
shelter, health care, and education. The stages of a nation's
economic development will obviously affect the fulfillment of this
right . . .
Third, the right to enjoy civil and political liberties - freedom of
thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press; freedom of
movement; . . . freedom to take part in government .... 164
The importance of this recognition and this definition should not
be underestimated. As President Carter noted in his October 4, 1977,
speech to the 32nd United Nations General Assembly:
We have already become a global community - but only in the
sense that we face common problems and share, for good or evil, a
common future. In this community, power to solve the world's prob-
lems - particularly economic and political power - no longer lies
solely in the hands of a few nations. -Power is now widely shared
among many nations with different cultures, different histories, and
different aspirations. The question is whether we will allow our dif-
ferences to defeat us or whether we will work together to realize our
common hopes for peace. 65
The Administration's analysis of the urgency of the current crisis is
supported in the legal and social science literature concerning the
stability and future of the international system. 66 In this writer's
164 W. Christopher, Human Rights: Principle and Realism, speech before the
American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1977), repriizted in 75 DEPT STATE BULL.' 269
(1977). But see Gillign, U.S. Seeks Improved U.N. Programs to Meet Basic Needs of
World's Poor, 75 DEPT STATE BULL. 204-05 (1977).
165 Pres. Carter, U.S. Role in a Peaceful Global Community, Dep't State News
Release (Oct. 4, 1977).
166 M. CAMPS, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERDEPENDENCE: A PRELIMINARY VIEW
(1974); WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (R. Bergsten & J. Krause
eds. 1975); J. TINBERGEN, RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: .A REPORT TO THE
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analysis, international law in the area of human rights is in the process
of development to such an extent that we may fairly characterize the
contemporary situation as a "revolution" in the international legal
order, comparable to a "period of crisis" between periods of normal
science in Thomas S. Kuhn's paradigm for the manner in which
change occurs in physical science. 67 Strong views are heard on several
sides, and the final theory upon which future conduct and investiga-
tion will be based has not yet been agreed upon or discovered.
It is my assumption that the best. description of the values and
priorities expressed by the United States under the Carter Administra-
tion in its conduct of foreign affairs can be found in the restatement of
constitutional, contractual values, found in John Rawls' A Theory of
Justice. 168 The two principles of justice, and the principle of the lexical
priority of liberty, go a. long way in providing a rationale and a
defense for American concerns in international relations. Additionally,
they serve to provide a connecting link between crucially 'intercon-
nected policy decisions in domestic and international policy, such as
energy policy, and between our conception of human rights and other
facets of Carter's broader policy. If the United States is to continue to
play a leading role in world affairs, shaping affairs rather than acting
defensively,, it needs to have a plausible and generally applicable set of
principles upon which to base its proposals for international coopera-
tion. And the conception that Rawls sets forth clearly states the set of
concerns and priorities which support our conduct under President
Carter.
First Principle. Each person is to have an equal right-to the most ex-
tensive system of equal liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all.
CLUB OF ROME (R.I.O.) (1976); A. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS esp. at 11-24 (1977);
ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER (S. Mendlovitz ed. 1976). See also the
growing literature in response to the U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, -G.A. Res. .3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); and the response to the Charter in the Kissinger proposals, Kissinger, Globa
Concensus and Economic Development, 10 INT'L LAW. 711 (1976). The intimate con-
nection between development and human rights is not accidental, though the nature
of the relationship is part of the debate in, this article. See Trubeck, What is an
Omelet?- What is an Egg? Some Thoughts on Economic Development and Human
Rights in Latin America, 1973 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L. L. 198. The ILO actively pro-
motes the notion that freedom of association for labor influences develolnient. G.
CAIRE, supra note 35.' , ' , .
167 T. KUHN, THE.STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
163 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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Second Principle. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . .
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all...
First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty) The principles of justice
are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be
restricted only for the sake of liberty ... 169
The United States, which consumes a far greater percentage of the
world's resources than it possesses of the world's population, is in no
position to defend itself against the onslaught of the "new international
order" advocates, and Soviet statism, except by recognizing once and
for all that its social and economic advantages cannot be justified
other than by using them to the advancement of the entire planetary
system (Rawls' Second Principle, or "the difference principle"). As a
counterpoint, we must demand as the quid pro quo of such a policy
acceptance of the Priority of Liberty by our fellow states in the United
Nations system.
The Carter definition of human rights, building on previous
United Nations commitments, makes it clear that the United Nations
and its members already have accepted, in principle, that liberty in
the Western sense is part of the tripartite package of rights guaranteed
by the United Nations system. By a mixture of advocacy and par-
ticular kinds of bargaining (linking aid to freedom for political
prisoners, for example), the Carter Administration already is seeking to
emphasize the importance that we, in the United States, give to the
libertarian component of the human rights equation. It should go fur-
ther, by seeking to work with those forces which make liberty essential
to the very conception of successful development, and to avoid specific
instances of conduct where the United States appears to sacrifice the
liberties of others for short-term economic or strategic gain (for exam-
ple, Kissinger's support of the Greek colonels).
By making this argument, I am not intending to assert that the in-
ternational legal order will or must adopt the Rawls hierarchy of
values as the basis for all future discussions. But it does appear to pro-
vide a fairer way of looking at issues than the current partisan array of
viewpoints, and could provide a basis for the principles ranking of
issues for negotiation in the North/South talks. There is no need at
this point to discuss the extensive literature on or in response to Rawls'
169 Id. at 302.
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work, 7 0 or to attempt to defend the origins of his principles of justice.
Rather, it seems clear that they do mirror the only principled explica-
tion of actual American policy which may stand any success of carry-
ing the day in evolving international discussions, and therefore should
be given all the considered support possible.
In short, the world system is in such grave danger from so many
quarters that cooperation and consensus are essential to the survival of
the species. Human rights is the core area in which common ground
must be found among nations, because it encompasses not just speech,
or voting, or the right to assemble, but the whole panoply of political,
economic, social, and cultural opportunities and potentials that add
up to the human experience. If we cannot agree on what human rights
are, and how they should be implemented in immediate, practical
terms, then we cannot agree on a strategy for species survival. 7 '
Unlike his predecessors, and some of his critics, President Carter
recognizes that American conceptions of the good, and of the priority
of liberty, are influenced by a somewhat misleadingly unique ex-
perience of affluence. We fail to perceive the legitimacy of demands
for global economic rights as part of the human rights conception,
because until recently we wrongly believed that our land was rich
enough to provide a high standard of living for all without significant
government intervention or public redistribution of wealth. 17 2 Similar-
ly, the myth of America's limitless resources prevents us from adopting
national energy conservation measures years after our allies and com-
petitors in the world have perceived the necessity of so doing.", Most
Americans, including most of those active in the political and legal
discourse on the matter, simply fail to accept the degree to which the
relevant debate has gone beyond the traditional frame of reference. If
we talk only about civil liberties first, last, and always in our discus-
sions of rights, we might as well be talking to a wall, and we should
170 See Frankel, Book Review, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 547 (1973), and
reviews cited therein.
"I Works suggesting this point include: B. WARD, THE HOME OF MAN (1976); G.
& P. MISCHE, TOWARD A HUMAN WORLD ORDER (1977); E. LASZLO, GOALS FOR
MANKIND: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME ON THE NEW HORIZONS OF GLOBAL COM-
MUNITY (1977).
172 Greenfield, The Absent Left, HARPER'S, Sept. 1977, at 19-26. See also Denitch,
A Socialist View on Global Human Rights, Newsletter of the Democratic Left, June
1977, at 1.
"I Shea, New Nuclear Policy Under the National Energy Plan, 29 BAYLOR L.
REV. 689, 703-09 (1977).
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not be surprised by the vehemence with which our complaints about
rights and liberties are rejected in many quarters because of this
parochial attitude and obsolete language.
Thus, President Carter's policy, as announced in his numerous
speeches and press conferences on the subject throughout his first year
in office, clearly adopts the philosophy that it is not enough for
America merely to assert her past values and her heritage, if she is in
fact to preserve her values and her national interest now and in the
future. Peace is indivisible, and peace requires universal recognition
and progressive implementation of human rights, as understood in the
tripartite sense of fundamental rights of the person, civil and political
rights, and economic and social rights.
The implementation of this policy requires aggressive, forward
presentation of the American position in all international fora; full fund-
ing of all valuable multilateral development programs; regular Con-
gressional involvement in oversight of United States participation in in-
ternational agencies, rather than on-again-off-again attitudes of
hostility or apathy; and taking the initiative in the global revolution
away from the totalitarian, Soviet-influenced states. 7 4 This requires
that we make explicit our policy that democratic and libertarian policy
entails support both for individual liberties and for the development
necessary to make those liberties meaningful. In this context, the
withdrawal from the ILO may have been a splash of cold-water in the
face of a possibly drunk man, but a man nonetheless. We should re-
join the ILO in time for the 64th General Conference in Geneva in
June 1978; we should hand the man a towel, and rejoin the struggle
for the rights of man.
APPENDIX I
ILO BUDGET CUTS FOR THE 1978-79 BIENNIUM
The United States withdrawal eliminated 25% of the ILO budget.
The ILO plans its budget on a biennial basis, so the first consequences
of the withdrawal must appear in the 1978-79 budget.
Director-General Blanchard proposed on November 1, 1977, that
previously adopted economies and efforts at streamlining be extended,
and that a transitional budget containing a 19.2% reduction, be
174 See C. OSAKWE, THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN UNIVERSAL
ORGANIZATIONS (1972), reviewed by J. Hazard in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 372 (1973).
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adopted by the ILO Governing Body for 1978-79. (ILO Doc. GB
204/PFA/12/23). However, the last session of the Governing Body was
concerned that the reduction was insufficient even with proposed
economies, and made further reductions in the regular budget. (ILO
Doc. GB 204/14/27). The consequences of further reductions include
greater cut-backs in human rights programs, such as complete deletion
of the legislative series of publications by the ILO. This publication
dates back to the founding of the organizations and has provided great
service to members over the years in studying and gaining from the ex-
perience of other members in labor legislation. In addition, the deci-
sions of the Committee on Freedom of Association will no longer be
published, preventing international access to this important body of
jurisprudence. Id. at 22.
The following table summarizes, the combined effect of the cuts
made by the Director-General and those made by the Governing Body.
It should be noted that the budget may suffer further reductions yet
when the Director-General submits his report to the Governing Body at
its 205th session, February-March 1978. Also the ILO Budget reflected
here does not include the possible grants from the U.N. Development
Program. These may indeed be increased in the future. Such grants
may not be applied to the regular core program of the ILO, however,
and in any event tend to further accentuate the emphasis on the ILO
as a purely developmental agency, at the expense of the western view
of development as appurtenant to the extension of freedom of associa-
tion.
SUMMARY OF PROGRAMME ADJUSTMENTS BY MAJOR PROGRAMME
$ $
1978-79
Budget Item Allotment Reduction %
A. Policy Making Organs
Int'l Labour Conference 3,407,672 105,850 3.1
Governing Body 841,500 26,200 3.1
Major Regional Meetings 763,948 238,736 31.3
POLICY MAKING ORGANS 5,013,120 370,786 7.4
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Industrial Relations and Labour
Administration
Further Reductions









Co-ordination of Operational Activities
Further Reductions
Int'l Institute for Labour Studies






















TECHNICAL PROGRAMMES 45,720,328 8,077,168 17.7
FURTHER REDUCTION TOTAL 2,409,327 5.2
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D. Services & Support Activities
Personnel
Further Reductions
Financial & Central Admin. Serv.
Further Reductions
Editorial & Document Serv.
Further Reductions
Legal Serv.















SERVICES & SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 53,550,666 11,001,106 20.5
FURTHER REDUCTION TOTAL 756,004 1.5
TOTAL REDUCTIONS 11,757,110 22.0
E. Regional Services & Relations
Relations & Meetings 6,765,720 743,818 11.0
Further Reductions 38,000 0.6
Public Information 2,021,454 566,470 28.0
Liaison Office With the U.N. 851,964 137,100 16.1
Mgmt., Field Programmes, Africa 7,338,670 536,096 7.3
Further Reductions 150,888 2.1
Mgmt., Field Programmes, Americas 7,522,738 977,398 13.0
Further Reductions 150,888 2.0
Mgmt., Field Programmes, Asia 6,684,036 1,315,860 19.7
Further Reductions 150.888 2.2
Mgmt., Field Programmes,
Middle East/Europe 4,646,638 1,339,052 28.8
Further Reductions 170,000 3.7
REGIONAL SERVICES & RELATIONS 35,831,220 5,615,794 15.7
FURTHER REDUCTION TOTAL 660.664 1.8
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F. Other Expenses
Other Budgetary Provisions 7,976,202 4,651,662 58.3
Operational Activities 11,337,500 2,200,000 19.4
Adjustment for Staff Turnover (536,974) -
TOTAL OF ORDINARY BUDGET (Part I) 163,033,146 32,458,890 19.9
FURTHER REDUCTION TOTAL 4,156,099 2.5
TOTAL REDUCTIONS 36,614,989 22.4
PART I




WORKING CAPITAL FUND 5,765,854
TOTAL (Parts I, II, & III) 169,074,000 36,614,989 21.7
APPENDIX II
International Labour Conference, 61st Session, 1976 Report VIII:
Report of the Working Party on Structure International Labour Of-
fice, Geneva, 1976, at 69.
AMENDED PROPOSAL CONCERNING RESOLUTIONS
PROCEDURE SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT MEMBER OF
THE UNITED STATES TO THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE
WORKING PARTY ON STRUCTURE
Article 17, paragraph 1(2) and (3) of the Standing orders of the
Conference should be amended as follows:
(2) Copies of all resolutions shall be available to delegates at
the International Labour Office not more than 48 hours after
the expiry of the limit laid down in the preceding sub-
paragraph: provided that the Director-General shall provi-
sionally, pending the consultation provided for in sub-
paragraph (3) below, withhold circulations of the text of any
resolution which either:
(a) proposes the condemnation of a member State or States
by name, or of the authorities or policies thereof, for
allegedly pursuing policies or practices not specifically
related to existing provisions of ILO Conventions or
Recommendations, or
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(b) proposes the condemnation of a member State or States
by name, or of the authorities or policies thereof, for
alleged violations of ILO standards contained in ILO
Conventions and Recommendations before the examina-
tion of those allegations under established ILO procedures
has been initiated and completed and the allegations so
examined have been sustained in the report thereof.
(3) When the circulation of any resolution has been provi-
sionally withheld as required by subparagraph (2), the
Director-General shall immediately prepare for the considera-
tion of a panel of the Committee of Experts on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations consisting of the Presi-
dent of the Committee and two other members appointed by
the Committee a report on: (a) the factual situation with
respect to the relationship of the resolution provisionally
withheld from circulation under subparagraph (2) (a) above, to
existing international labour Conventions and Recommenda-
tions, or (b) the status of any examination under established
ILO procedures of the alleged violations contained in the
resolution in relation to the requirements of subparagraph 2(b)
above. Unless such resolution is declared receivable by the
unanimous decision of the panel, in which case it shall be
available to delegates not later than the date fixed for the
opening of the session of the Conference, the resolution shall
neither be referred to a Resolutions Committee by the Con-
ference nor moved at any sitting of the Conference.
1978]

